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Cooked up in the Dinner Hour? Sir Arthur 
Wilson’s War Plan, Reconsidered*
In the summer of 1911, escalating tensions between France and Germany 
threatened to plunge the continent of Europe into war. In anticipation 
of hostilities, the British government convened a select sub-committee 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) to discuss potential British 
involvement in the event of a Franco–German conflict. At this conclave, 
a debate took place between the government’s senior naval and military 
advisors, who proposed widely differing national strategies: either the 
commitment of British troops to the Continent in support of France 
or a maritime-only option, involving a ‘close’ blockade and amphibious 
landings on the German coastline. Historians have long viewed the 
meeting—the last official discussion of British national strategy at 
the CID prior to the outbreak of the First World War—as a decisive 
indicator of the Liberal government’s strategic intentions in the event 
of a European war. While it is no longer considered that the outcome 
confirmed a British military ‘continental commitment’, or predestined 
British intervention in a continental war at all, it is generally accepted 
that the War Office General Staff scored a major political victory over 
the Admiralty in the eyes of the assembled politicians.1 Indeed, historians 
have been unanimous in agreeing that the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir 
Arthur Wilson, badly mishandled the Navy’s case.2
* The phrase ‘cooked up in the dinner hour’ was first coined to describe the performance of the 
Admiralty representatives at the 114th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence by the then Naval 
Assistant Secretary, Maurice Hankey. However, Hankey’s memoirs contain a typographical error in 
their reproduction of this phrase, which has been corrected for the purposes of the title of this essay: 
see M.P.A. Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914–18 (2 vols., London, 1961), i. 81, and K. Wilson, 
‘Hankey’s Appendix: Some Admiralty Manoeuvres During and After the Agadir Crisis, 1911’, War in 
History, i (1994), p. 82, n. 8. I should like to thank the two anonymous referees for their perceptive 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied 
in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Joint 
Services Command and Staff College, the UK Ministry of Defence or any other government agency.
1 The literature on the meeting is vast and it would be impossible to summarise it exhaustively 
here. For the most recent scholarship on the topic, see H. Strachan, ‘The British Army, its General 
Staff and the Continental Commitment, 1904–14’, in D. French and B. Holden Reid, eds., The 
British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, c.1890–1939 (London, 2002), pp.  74–94, and 
T.G. Otte, ‘“The Method in which we were Schooled by Experience”: British Strategy and a 
Continental Commitment before 1914’, in K. Neilson and G. Kennedy, eds., The British Way in 
Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856–1956 (Farnham, 2010), pp. 301–24.
2 For a selection of criticisms see Hankey, Supreme Command, i. 81; A.J. Marder, From the 
Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919 (5 vols., London 1961–
70), i. 370–72 and 389–93; S.R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France 
Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Cambridge, MA, 1969), pp. 189–94; J. Gooch, The Plans of War: The 
General Staff and British Military Strategy, c.1900–1916 (London, 1974), pp. 289–92; P. Halpern, 
A Naval History of World War I (London, 1994), p. 21; D. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming 
of War: Europe, 1904–1914 (Oxford, 1996), p. 213; H. Strachan, The First World War I To Arms 
(Oxford, 2001), pp. 394–5; C.I. Hamilton, The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval 
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At the meeting, held on 23 August, Wilson informed the sub-
committee that ‘the policy of the Admiralty on the outbreak of war 
with Germany would be to blockade the whole of the German North 
Sea coast’, and that he intended to augment this action with a series 
of ambitious amphibious operations.3 Such a strategy, he argued, 
represented the best means available of tying down sufficient German 
divisions to reduce the military pressure on France. However, neither the 
politicians nor the military members of the Committee were impressed 
by the Admiral’s plans. Reacting to Wilson’s presentation, the Home 
Secretary, Winston Churchill, quipped that ‘I only hope they [the 
Germans] may be filled with as much misgiving as I am’.4 Churchill 
was not alone in expressing concerns about the Admiralty presentation. 
The Naval Assistant Secretary to the Committee and former naval war 
planner, Maurice Hankey, later remarked that the Admiralty’s scheme 
savoured of having been ‘cooked up in the dinner hour’.5 Richard 
Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, threatened to resign from the 
Cabinet if a naval general staff was not formed immediately to improve 
the Admiralty’s apparently moribund planning process6 and the Prime 
Minister Herbert Asquith condemned Wilson’s plan as ‘puerile’ and 
‘wholly impracticable’.7 Taking their lead from these contemporaries, 
historians have heaped opprobrium upon both Wilson and the strategy 
he outlined to the sub-committee: it has variously been labelled as 
‘dangerous and ill-thought-out’,8 ‘vague, ill-advised and dangerous’9 
and ‘patently unworkable’.10 One scholar has even argued that the First 
Sea Lord was so out of step with the course of Admiralty planning that 
it was unlikely that his orders would have been carried out in the event 
of war.11 Thus, historians now agree that while the Admiralty’s poor 
performance did not directly result in a British commitment to military 
intervention on the continent, Wilson’s failure to articulate a coherent 
Policy-Making, 1805–1927 (Cambridge, 2011), p. 224; N.A. Lambert, ‘Admiral Sir Arthur Knyvett-
Wilson, V.C. (1910–1911)’, in M.H. Murfett, ed., The First Sea Lords from Fisher to Mountbatten 
(Westport, CT, 1995), pp. 45–7; N.A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia, SC, 
1999), pp. 203–11; and N.A. Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the 
First World War (Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. 152–5.
3 The National Archives [hereafter TNA], CAB 2/2, fo. 130, CID, ‘Minutes of the 114th 
Meeting, August 23rd, 1911’, p. 11.
4 Cambridge, Churchill College Archives Centre [hereafter CAC], AGDF 2/1, fos. 93–4, 
A. Grant-Duff, diary entry, 25 Aug. 1911.
5 Hankey, Supreme Command, i. 81.
6 Haldane to Asquith, 31 Aug. 1911, quoted in J.P. MacKintosh, ‘The Role of the Committee 
of Imperial Defence before 1914’, English Historical Review, lxxvii (1962), p. 499, and Williamson, 
Politics of Grand Strategy, p. 194.
7 National Library of Scotland [hereafter NLS], Haldane Papers, MS 5909, fo. 140, Asquith 
to Haldane, 31 Aug. 1911.
8 P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (1976; new edn. London, 2004 new 
edn), p. 235.
9 Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, p. 192.
10 Lambert, Planning Armageddon, p. 154.
11 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, p. 206, and Lambert, Planning Armageddon, p. 154.
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alternative to the General Staff ’s proposals almost certainly prevented 
the development of plans for amphibious operations in the immediate 
pre-war period;12 revealed chronic weaknesses in the Admiralty’s 
planning process;13 and demonstrated Wilson’s personal failure to keep 
up with the rapid pace of technological development.14
However, in their willingness to castigate the Admiralty’s supposedly 
inadequate strategic planning process, historians have neglected 
a body of evidence vital to the accurate comprehension of the plans 
that Wilson revealed to the sub-committee in August 1911. These 
documents confirm that the plans which Wilson presented more closely 
reflected the consensus of Admiralty opinion than has generally been 
appreciated.15 Indeed, this material demonstrates that, far from failing 
to appreciate the conditions of modern naval warfare, Wilson was in fact 
something of a progressive strategist, and that the plans he put forward 
to the CID were based upon the Navy’s latest practical experiments in 
anti-submarine warfare. Knowledge of these documents necessitates a 
major re-assessment, both of the Admiralty’s strategic planning process 
and of Wilson’s much-maligned role within it. It also has significant 
implications not only for our understanding of British strategy during 
the Agadir Crisis, but also of Admiralty planning during the First World 
War. Wilson returned from retirement to serve as an advisor to the naval 
leadership for much of the War and, as we shall see, during that period 
Churchill considered the Admiral’s strategic views to be sufficiently 
cogent to adopt the defining principles of the strategy that Sir Arthur 
had originally outlined to the CID during the Agadir Crisis. Indeed, 
from December 1914 onwards, it appears that Churchill subscribed 
far more closely to Wilson’s strategic advice than he did to that of 
Admiral Sir John Fisher, whom he had recalled to direct the Admiralty’s 
war effort some two months earlier. This article will therefore seek to 
demonstrate that the key naval elements of the strategy that Sir Arthur 
Wilson outlined to the CID in August 1911 were far more realistic than 
is generally appreciated and that, but for the Cabinet’s decision to attack 
the Dardanelles in January 1915, an updated iteration of them might 
have been implemented during the First World War.
12 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i.  388–95; Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, 
p. 196; D. French, British Economic and Strategic Planning (London, 1982), p. 32; and Strachan, 
‘Continental Commitment, 1904–14’, p. 77.
13 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i.  205–6, 244–5, 246–7, 256–7 and 265; N.A.M. 
Rodger, The Admiralty (Lavenham, 1979), pp.  126–7 and 129; Williamson, Politics of Grand 
Strategy, pp. 182–92; A. Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford, 1989), 
p. 285; Strachan, First World War, i. 379–81; N. Black, The British Naval Staff in the First World 
War (Woodbridge, 2009), pp. 54–8; and Hamilton, Making of the Modern Admiralty, pp. 222–5.
14 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i. 213–14, 370–1 and 389–93; French, British Economic 
and Strategic Planning, p. 32; Stevenson, Armaments, p. 213; Strachan, First World War, i. 394; 
Hamilton, Making of the Modern Admiralty, p. 224; Lambert, ‘Wilson’; Lambert, Fisher’s Naval 
Revolution, pp. 203–11; and Lambert, Planning Armageddon, pp. 152–4.
15 S.T. Grimes, Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887–1918 (Woodbridge, 2012), 
pp. 164–71; D.G. Morgan-Owen, ‘“History is a Record of Exploded Ideas”: Sir John Fisher and 
Home Defence, 1904–1910’, International History Review, xxxvi (2014), pp. 550–72.
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I
Scholarly criticisms of the plans that Wilson outlined to the CID in 
August 1911 have been founded upon the basic supposition that the 
aggressive inshore operations he proposed were no longer realistic 
in the face of increasingly effective underwater weaponry. David 
French, for example, has asserted that ‘Wilson’s plan was unrealistic 
because it ignored the dangers a fleet operating near the German coast 
would face from mines and submarines’.16 On first inspection, this 
criticism seems to be entirely reasonable. Indeed, questions as to the 
practicality of such operations under modern conditions began at the 
meeting of the CID itself. In his presentation, Wilson appeared to 
betray an inconsistent appreciation of the dangers German torpedo 
craft would pose to ships operating off the German coastline. While 
emphasising that ‘the safety of our Fleet depended upon preventing 
the German destroyers from getting out’,17 he made no mention of 
how he intended to mitigate the danger that German submarines 
and mines would pose to British vessels conducting the operations 
he envisaged off the German coastline. Wilson’s ambiguous treatment 
of this important point provoked several members of the Committee 
to express their doubts as to the practicality of the proposed inshore 
operations. During the subsequent discussion, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir William Nicholson, 
pointed out the great danger that enemy submarines would pose to 
British ships operating off the German coastline and declared that any 
plan which involved placing warships and troop transports in such a 
vulnerable position would be ‘doomed to failure’. Churchill was equally 
concerned, enquiring ‘whether our ships would not incur great risk 
by entering these narrow waters’.18 However, the most authoritative 
criticism of Wilson’s proposals was that of Maurice Hankey, the Naval 
Assistant Secretary to the Committee. In his memoirs, Hankey (who 
went on to become one of the most influential figures in the British 
defence establishment during the First World War) recalled how ‘most 
of those present were genuinely alarmed at the hint of an attempt 
at a close blockade of the German coast in the face of submarines 
and destroyers’.19 Hankey’s depiction of the professional head of the 
Royal Navy as something of a reactionary who failed to appreciate 
the implications new technologies had upon the conduct of war at sea 
has subsequently informed widespread scholarly criticism, both of the 
apparent weaknesses in Admiralty administration that had allowed the 
16 French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, p.  23. This argument has become 
entrenched in the mainstream literature; see Stevenson, Armaments, p. 213, and Strachan, First 
World War, i. 394.
17 TNA, CAB 2/2, fo. 132, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, p. 14.
18 Ibid., fo. 131, pp. 12–13.
19 Hankey, Supreme Command, i. 81.
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First Sea Lord to make such an ostensibly incoherent presentation to 
the government, and of Wilson himself.
This criticism of Wilson for reviving the apparently moribund strategy 
of close blockade has been reinforced by research on the Admiralty’s 
planning process. Scholarship on this topic has tended to emphasise 
that the Navy had moved away from close blockade in the early 1900s 
for the same reasons suggested by Hankey; namely that torpedoes, 
submarines and mines had made such an endeavour too risky to be 
seriously contemplated under modern conditions. This interpretation, 
popularised by the influential American scholar Arthur J. Marder in 
the 1940s, has led successive historians to argue that Wilson was out of 
step with the consensus of expert opinion when he advocated reverting 
to a close blockade in August 1911. Marder argued that, beginning in 
the early 1900s, ‘the increasing power of the torpedo and the submarine 
profoundly affected naval strategy, tactics, and ship construction’.20 
Basing his analysis upon the records of the manoeuvres the Navy 
conducted between 1888 and 1905, he concluded that ‘close blockade 
received its coup de grâce by 1903–4’, and that by 1904 at the latest 
‘the Board [of Admiralty] … seriously doubted whether close blockade 
would be feasible in future’.21 Marder’s analysis of the development of 
naval thought over the previous decades led him to criticise Wilson’s 
apparent willingness to ignore the evidence of successive practical 
exercises by reviving the close blockade in the summer of 1911, stating 
his belief that ‘close blockade was by this date too risky’ and that ‘no 
admiral would have undertaken to keep a squadron cruising constantly 
in the Bight thirty miles from Heligoland’.22
Scholars working on the development of Admiralty strategic 
planning have tended to support Marder’s interpretation, both of the 
development of British blockade doctrine away from a close blockade23 
and of Wilson’s limitations as a strategist.24 Indeed, the recent trend has 
been to place an even greater emphasis on the transformative impact of 
underwater weaponry on naval warfare. Nicholas A. Lambert has argued 
that, confronted with the difficulties of mounting a close blockade in 
the face of enemy torpedo craft and submarines, the Admiralty had 
decided to adopt an ‘entirely new’ strategy based around ‘mutual sea 
denial’ after 1904. According to this revisionist interpretation, under 
the leadership of the ‘radical naval thinker’ Admiral Sir John Fisher, 
the Navy planned and implemented the ‘revolutionary’ new strategy of 
‘flotilla defence’, which relied upon using torpedo craft and submarines 
20 A.J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power (New York, 1940), p. 368.
21 Ibid., pp. 368–9.
22 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i. 370–1.
23 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, pp. 243–4, and M. Partridge, ‘The Royal Navy and the 
End of Close Blockade, 1885–1905: A  Revolution in Naval Strategy?’, Mariner’s Mirror, lxxv 
(1989), pp. 119–36.
24 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, p. 235.
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to ‘deny’ the use of the North Sea to enemy armoured vessels.25 This 
strategy was supposedly in place by 1905 and survived until Fisher retired 
at the end of 1909.26 On this basis, Lambert echoes Marder in arguing 
that Fisher never seriously contemplated enforcing a close blockade 
before 1910, although he reaches that conclusion by a markedly different 
route. According to Lambert, Wilson—whom Fisher had selected as 
his successor on the basis that the two men shared the same strategic 
outlook—reversed some of the more innovative and dynamic planning 
conducted by the previous regime27 and departed from the consensus 
of Admiralty opinion, which remained in favour of limited North Sea 
operations and plans to wage economic warfare against Germany.28 In 
the face of this scholarship, Wilson’s reputation among historians as a 
deficient strategist has hardened in recent years. Indeed, the belief that 
Wilson put forward an unrealistic plan to the sub-committee on 23 
August 1911 is now so well established that, with one exception,29 little 
serious effort has been made to challenge this viewpoint.
Wilson’s presentation to the CID was, without doubt, unsuccessful. 
It provoked a considerable political backlash against the Admiralty, 
which ultimately resulted in Churchill being appointed to the 
post of First Lord of the Admiralty with a brief to reform the naval 
administration and to create a naval staff with the capacity to prepare 
coherent strategic plans. However, upon closer inspection, the notion 
that it was the manifest impracticality of close blockade under modern 
conditions that provoked this censure is open to serious question. 
Evidence that the close blockade had not been discredited by naval 
planners was provided in the autumn of 1911, when the Director of 
Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Alexander Bethell, appeared before 
another CID sub-committee, convened to investigate the question 
of British trade with Germany in time of war.30 The nature of the 
Admiralty’s strategic intentions was a matter of considerable relevance to 
the proceedings of this body, since it had important legal ramifications 
for the Navy’s ability to seize the cargoes of neutral ships bound for 
25 N.A. Lambert, ‘Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defence, 1904–1909’, Journal of 
Military History, lix (1995), pp. 639–60; Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 10, 116–17, 121–6, 
162–4, 174–6 and 183–4; N.A. Lambert, ‘Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: The 
Impact of the Communications Revolution’, Journal of Strategic Studies, xxvii (2004), pp. 272–97 
at pp. 278–9; N.A. Lambert, ‘Strategic Command and Control for Maneuver Warfare: Creation of 
the Royal Navy’s War Room System, 1905–1915’, Journal of Military History, lxix (2005), pp. 361–
410; and Lambert, Planning Armageddon, pp. 32, 41–2, 59 and 75–7.
26 Lambert, ‘Flotilla Defence’, pp. 654–8, and Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 122–3.
27 Lambert, ‘Wilson’, pp.  45–7; Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp.  203–11; Lambert, 
‘Transformation and Technology’, p.  286; and Lambert, ‘Strategic Command and Control’, 
pp. 389–91.
28 That Wilson halted earlier plans for economic warfare against Germany was first suggested 
in Offer, Agrarian Interpretation, pp. 285–8. This view is partially qualified in Lambert, Planning 
Armageddon, pp. 153–5.
29 Grimes, Strategy and War Planning, pp. 164–70; however, even this analysis presents only 
a partial picture.
30 The records of this body are held in TNA, CAB 17/89.
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German ports in wartime. While Bethell was not obliged to divulge 
any details of Admiralty strategy to the sub-committee, he did provide 
a general indication of the naval leadership’s intentions in the event 
of war with Germany. At a meeting of the group on 22 November, he 
informed the assembly that ‘it was the intention of the Admiralty to 
establish a close blockade of the North Sea ports on the declaration 
of war’.31 If a close blockade was widely considered to be unworkable 
under modern conditions and this had been the cause of the hostile 
reception that Wilson’s presentation had received on 23 August, the 
government would surely not have allowed the Admiralty’s adherence 
to such an outdated approach to prejudice a major investigation into 
an issue of considerable national importance some three months later. 
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that Churchill would have permitted 
such a nominally retrograde step had his appointment as First Lord 
been due primarily to the impracticality of close blockade.
Moreover, the notion that Wilson’s performance discredited his views 
on naval strategic issues is also problematic. His opinion continued 
to carry appreciable weight with senior politicians after his enforced 
retirement at the end of 1911. Indeed, Sir Arthur retained sufficient 
authority and political confidence to challenge the incumbent 
Admiralty administration until well into the First World War. This is 
demonstrated by internal Admiralty correspondence during the summer 
of 1913. At that point, Admiralty officials wanted to petition the CID 
for funds to mount fixed defences at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, which 
location was increasingly gaining favour among naval planners as the 
Fleet’s principal anchorage in the event of war with Germany. However, 
during the ensuing discussion, Churchill explained to his professional 
colleagues that ‘I apprehend the greatest difficulties in obtaining the 
assent of CID or the Cabinet to these proposals, in view of Sir Arthur 
Wilson’s almost certain opposition’.32 Why Churchill considered 
Wilson’s dissent to be such a definitive obstruction to the War Staff ’s 
proposals if the Admiral’s views had been entirely discredited in the eyes 
of the Cabinet by his performance in August 1911 is unclear. Moreover, 
Haldane—who had been especially critical of the Admiral in the wake 
of the Agadir Crisis—petitioned Churchill to recall Wilson to the 
Admiralty after the outbreak of war in October 1914,33 and Churchill 
subsequently heeded this advice. Churchill even attempted to return 
Wilson to the post of First Sea Lord, following Fisher’s resignation in 
May 1915.34 The political support that Wilson enjoyed in 1914–15 is at 
odds with the notion that he had betrayed fundamental weaknesses in 
his proficiency as a strategist in August 1911. Politicians undoubtedly 
31 TNA, WO 106/45, CID, ‘Enquiry Regarding Trading with the Enemy, Minutes of the 
Second Meeting, November 22, 1911’, pp. 2–3.
32 TNA, ADM 116/1293, Note by Churchill, 11 Aug. 1913.
33 R. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford, 1973), p. 457.
34 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, ii. 281–2.
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had good reason to view Wilson as a poor custodian of the Admiralty 
in peacetime, but the fact that his stock rose rapidly after the outbreak 
of war indicates that they retained considerable faith in his competence 
as a potential strategic director of the Navy.
That aspects of Wilson’s strategic thinking caused consternation 
among members of the CID in August 1911, not least the Prime Minister, 
is beyond dispute. In the aftermath of the meeting Asquith confided 
to Haldane that ‘A. Wilson’s “plan” can only be described as puerile, 
and I have dismissed it at once as wholly impractical’.35 Nevertheless, 
analysis as to why the members of the CID were so dismayed by 
Wilson’s plans reveals that the Committee’s response did not result 
from a keen awareness of recent developments in naval warfare that 
may have rendered the strategy of close blockade unrealistic, but was 
rather the consequence of a combination of factors largely incidental 
to the viability of the naval aspects of Wilson’s scheme. In order to 
appreciate the manner in which Wilson’s reputation as a sound source 
of advice on naval strategic matters survived the Agadir Crisis, it is 
therefore necessary to differentiate between the naval and grand 
strategic aspects of the plan that Wilson outlined to the CID. The 
tendency of historians to conflate these aspects of Wilson’s presentation 
is superficially appropriate: the Admiral failed to make clear that he 
was attempting to outline more than a purely naval plan of campaign, 
making no mention of commercial blockade or operations outside the 
North Sea.36 Yet, the scheme he described to the sub-committee did in 
fact represent an attempt at more than just a naval war plan. This much 
can be seen from the detail of Wilson’s proposals about amphibious 
operations.
Wilson’s initial presentation described amphibious landings as a 
‘necessary’ adjunct to naval operations in the Heligoland Bight.37 
However, while he considered the seizure of an advanced base from 
which to refuel the Navy’s destroyers to be desirable from a naval 
perspective, Wilson does not appear to have viewed amphibious 
landings as vital to the enforcement of the blockade itself. In his 
presentation he had explained that, ‘if possible we should maintain our 
watch upon the German coast-line with destroyers’, but acknowledged 
that ‘they would, however be 300 miles way from any British base, 
so that none of them could remain very long at a time on station’. 
He also accepted that ‘the destroyers would retire when driven off 
by the enemy’s larger ships’.38 These statements strongly suggest that 
he did not intend to establish permanent positions on the German 
littoral to facilitate the naval blockade. This much was confirmed 
35 NLS, MS 5905, fo. 140, Asquith to Haldane, 31 Aug. 1911.
36 For Wilson’s scepticism about the efficacy of blockading Germany, see Offer, Agrarian 
Interpretation, pp. 285–6 and Lambert, Planning Armageddon, pp. 131–6.
37 TNA, CAB 2/2, fos. 130–1, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, pp. 11–12.
38 TNA, CAB 2/2, fo. 130, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, p. 11.
 by guest on June 28, 2015
http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EHR
Page 9 of 42Sir Arthur WilSon’S WAr Pl An
during the discussion of his presentation, when Wilson qualified his 
support for assaults against Wilhelmshaven, Wangeroog and the Kiel 
Canal, explaining that such additional landings might oblige the 
Germans to retain troops for the defence of their coasts ‘apart from the 
direct advantage to the Navy’. Under questioning from Churchill, he 
admitted that the seizure of the potential targets he had mentioned ‘was 
not essential’ to the naval aspects of his scheme. Crucially, when pressed 
further as to ‘whether the close blockade and the landing of troops’ 
were both essential, Wilson replied simply that ‘all the experience of 
recent manoeuvres showed that close blockade was necessary’; he made 
no mention of the necessity of landing military forces on the German 
mainland to support the operation.39 The amphibious landings and 
the close blockade were not, therefore, mutually dependent. This was 
certainly the impression that the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, drew 
from the proceedings. During the discussion Grey stated that, ‘so far as 
he could judge, the combined operations outlined were not essential to 
naval success’.40 When Grey pressed Wilson as to whether the capture 
of Schillighorn was vital to his plans, the Admiral admitted simply ‘that 
it was not essential’. Thus, it appears that Wilson’s advocacy of multiple 
landings on the German coastline was his attempt at grand, as opposed 
to simply naval, strategy. In a paper dating from May 1907, Wilson had 
previously outlined his conviction that, should Britain be drawn into 
a Franco-German war in support of France, ‘the only way in which we 
could give serious assistance to France would be by a floating army, 
making raids on different parts of the German coast and so diverting 
troops from the main theatre of war’.41 In 1909 he had reiterated to the 
Cabinet his view that maritime blockade alone would be insufficient 
to force Germany to terms.42 Significantly, while Wilson had envisaged 
using ‘obsolete types’ of vessel to conduct inshore bombardments 
in amphibious raids in 1907, at that point he had not contemplated 
enforcing a close blockade in conjunction with such landings. Wilson’s 
support for amphibious operations against the German mainland 
coastline therefore appears to have been distinct from the purely naval 
aspects of his strategic thinking. Recognition of this fact is vital to the 
accurate assessment of the Admiralty’s presentation in August 1911, 
which was an attempt at describing a purely maritime national strategy, 
rather than a naval war plan. Articulating the benefits of a grand strategy 
based upon sea power placed the First Sea Lord at a disadvantage 
relative to the military representatives at the meeting, who could focus 
specifically on military operations on the Continent. A  major naval 
defeat could have had catastrophic implications for Britain’s position 
39 TNA, CAB 2/2, fos. 130–1, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, pp. 11–12.
40 Ibid., fo. 132, p. 14.
41 A. Wilson, ‘Remarks on the War Plans’, May, 1907, in P. Kemp, ed., The Papers of Admiral 
Sir John Fisher (2 vols., London, 1960–64), ii. 459.
42 Offer, Agrarian Interpretation, p. 285.
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as the pre-eminent financial and maritime power, would have dealt a 
crushing blow to civilian morale and threatened the integrity of the 
Empire. The Admiralty’s plan had to consider all of these dangers, 
while simultaneously explaining how British command of the sea could 
be brought to bear on Germany, a continental power with internal lines 
of communication and access to the resources of neighbouring states. 
By contrast, the General Staff had simply to outline their intentions for 
the six divisions of the British Expeditionary Force, the fate of which 
was largely incidental to British national interests and to public morale.
Attempting to assess the extent to which Wilson’s ‘floating army’ 
alone represented a credible strategy for Britain to adopt in the event 
of a Franco-German war is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it 
to say that it appears open to no less doubt than the General Staff ’s 
claim that ‘it was quite likely that our six divisions might prove to 
be the deciding factor’43 in the opening moves of a Continental war. 
Asquith certainly appears to have been unconvinced by either option 
in the aftermath of the meeting.44 Rather, it is important to appreciate 
that it was the Admiralty’s failure to make adequate preparations to 
assess and prepare to implement its proposed national strategy, rather 
than the detail of its close blockade plan, that resulted in the trenchant 
criticisms by the political leaders present at the 114th meeting of the 
CID. The cavalier manner in which Wilson proposed such major 
amphibious operations—without consulting the War Office or even 
calculating the exact number of troops that would be required—was 
clearly open to justifiable criticism. The Admiralty’s unwillingness to 
consult the War Office regarding the practicality of such ambitious 
joint operations was characteristic of the naval leadership’s hostile and 
unco-operative attitude to both the War Office and the CID, which did 
little to endear it to political leaders.45 This latest, egregious example of 
the Admiralty’s apparent disdain for discussing its intentions, even with 
those other government departments integral to the success of its plans, 
was doubtless compounded by Wilson’s complacent assertion that ‘he 
did not anticipate any difficulty’ in storming the heavily fortified island 
of Heligoland with marines immediately after the outbreak of war.46
Equally damaging was the impression of administrative incompetence 
conveyed earlier in the meeting, when neither Wilson nor the First Lord 
of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, appeared to have been aware that 
the Admiralty’s Transport Department had already co-operated with 
the General Staff in the production of plans to convey a military force 
to the Continent at the outset of a Franco-German war.47 The lack of 
43 TNA, CAB 2/2, fo. 127, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, p. 5.
44 NLS, MS 5909, fo. 140, Asquith to Haldane, 31 Aug. 1911, and fo. 146, Asquith to Haldane, 
9 Sept. 1911; and Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 193–204.
45 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i. 213–14.
46 TNA, CAB 2/2, fo. 131, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, p. 12.
47 This was subsequently proven to be a misunderstanding: NLS, MS 5909, fo. 147, Haldane 
to Asquith, 28 Sept. 1911.
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co-operation and foresight revealed by the Admiralty representatives 
explained the condemnation they received; as Hankey tersely recorded, 
‘the failure of the Admiralty to co-ordinate its plans with those of the War 
Office made a most unfavourable impression on the Government’.48 As 
it was the Admiralty’s failure to prepare a credible national strategy, rather 
than the detail of its close blockade plan, which was the primary cause of 
the criticisms that Asquith, Haldane and Churchill voiced following the 
naval presentation, their continued respect for Wilson’s views on purely 
naval issues is comprehensible. It also places an important qualification 
on the evidence frequently deployed to support the viewpoint that the 
close blockade strategy was outdated and retrograde. Consequently, 
much of this interpretation relies upon Hankey’s testimony and on 
scholarly analysis of British blockade doctrine. We shall therefore 
consider each of these elements in turn.
As we have seen, in his memoirs Hankey did much to establish the 
picture of Wilson as an outdated strategist. He recollected how ‘most 
of those present were genuinely alarmed at the hint of an attempt 
at a close blockade of the German coast in the face of submarines 
and destroyers’ and stated that ‘Admiral Wilson had filled me with 
dismay’ at the meeting.49 However, there is evidence to suggest that 
this nominally authoritative testimony is misleading. Earlier in the 
year, in February 1911, Hankey had produced a memorandum on ‘The 
Declaration of London from the point of view of War with Germany’. 
This document evaluated the potential impact that British ratification 
of the Declaration of London—an international agreement intended 
to regulate the laws of war at sea—might have upon the action of the 
Royal Navy during an Anglo-German war. In the paper, Hankey set 
out the consequences of British non-ratification of the agreement. One 
of its key passages read:
all of these articles can be conveyed during war into or out of any German 
port in neutral bottoms unless we have declared a blockade of that port. 
The only remedy is to establish a blockade of the whole German coast. 
So far as the ports in the North Sea are concerned this should present no 
insurmountable difficulty.50
The full significance of this document becomes clear when the legal 
definition of a ‘blockade’ as set out in the Declaration of London is 
considered. For a port or stretch of coastline to be considered ‘under 
blockade’, the blockade had to be effective, ‘i.e. it must be maintained 
by a force sufficient to prevent access to the enemy’s coastline’.51 In 
48 Hankey, Supreme Command, i. 82.
49 Hankey, Supreme Command, i. 81.
50 TNA, ADM 116/1236, Hankey, ‘The Declaration of London from the point of view of War 
with Germany’, 15 Feb. 1911, pp. 2–3.
51 TNA, ADM 137/1936, fo. 15, Callaghan, ‘Blockade of the North Sea Coast of German 
Empire’, 31 Aug. 1911, p. 1.
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other words, only six months prior to Wilson’s presentation to the CID 
during the Agadir Crisis, Hankey himself had seen ‘no insurmountable 
difficulty’ in maintaining a considerable force of British warships off 
the German North Sea coast. Whether Wilson’s proposals did in fact 
cause the Naval Assistant Secretary ‘dismay’ on 23 August is thus clearly 
open to question. What does appear clear from Hankey’s memoirs 
is that the apparent inconsistency of Admiralty statements regarding 
the practicality of inshore operations magnified the impression of 
administrative incompetence that the naval representatives gave to the 
Committee. Hankey noted how, at the meeting, ‘Sir Arthur Wilson’s 
own published Memorandum on Invasion, in which he had laid stress 
on the value of submarines and torpedo craft for dealing with enemy 
transports, was thrown in his face to bring out the impossibility of 
keeping British warships or transports off the German coast’.52 The 
memorandum in question had been drafted the previous November 
in anticipation of a speech by Lord Roberts to the House of Lords 
on the necessity of compulsory service. It had then been reproduced 
as an appendix to the second edition of General Sir Ian Hamilton’s 
book, Compulsory Service, which appeared in January 1911.53 In it, the 
Admiralty had emphasised the important role which it was expected 
that submarines would play in defeating a German invasion attempt:
supposing that by some extraordinary lucky chance the transports were able 
to reach our coast without being detected … long before half the troops 
could be landed, the transports would be attacked and sunk by submarines 
which are stationed along the coast for that purpose.54
It went on to suggest that, when combined with the Navy’s large number 
of destroyers, submarines would form ‘a very effective second line of 
defence’. The logical inference from this paper was that vessels acting 
as part of a close blockade would be similarly vulnerable to submarine 
and destroyer attack. After Wilson’s presentation on 23 August 1911, 
Nicholson, the CIGS, referred specifically to Wilson’s ‘invasion’ 
memorandum when he questioned the Admiral’s logic in advocating 
amphibious and inshore operations in the face of German submarines 
and destroyers.55 Wilson’s reply—that the situation off the German 
coastline would be different from that which had been discussed in the 
Admiralty’s earlier memorandum—was unconvincing.
Although not mentioned by Hankey in his memoirs, another series 
of statements by Wilson may have played an equally important role 
in shaping the reaction to his presentation.56 In June 1909, some six 
52 Hankey, Supreme Command, i. 81.
53 I. Hamilton, Compulsory Service: A Study of the Question in Light of Experience (2nd edn., 
London, 1911).
54 TNA, CAB 17/100, fo. 23, Admiralty, ‘Notes’, 19 Nov. 1910, p. 1.
55 TNA, CAB 2/2, fo. 131, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, p. 12.
56 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 206–7.
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months before he became First Sea Lord, Wilson had been summoned 
to provide expert testimony to a CID enquiry into the administration 
of Sir John Fisher, convened as the result of accusations made by 
Admiral Lord Charles Beresford. On that occasion, during a discussion 
of strategic issues, Wilson had stated that:
After a great deal of consideration I decided that it was quite impossible to 
attempt to keep a really close watch off the German ports, because of the 
risk ... Therefore I came to the conclusion that you could not keep a really 
effective watch off the German ports.57
During these earlier proceedings the Prime Minister, Asquith, had been 
much impressed by the Admiral’s clarity and manner, and accepted 
his opinions as authoritative.58 Haldane and Grey had also witnessed 
Wilson’s testimony to the Beresford Enquiry.59 That Wilson had 
apparently reversed the position that he had outlined to the CID only 
two years earlier cannot but have contributed to the negative impression 
created by his presentation to the Committee in August 1911. However, 
while such inconsistency certainly hinted at the need for a general staff 
to co-ordinate naval strategic planning in a more coherent manner, it 
was far from definitive proof that Wilson was an incompetent naval 
strategist. Rather, Wilson’s apparently contradictory statements merely 
demonstrated that the Admiral had changed his mind on the advisability 
of enforcing a close blockade of the German coastline since June 1909.60 
We shall re-examine the reasoning that led Wilson to make this volte 
face presently. But, before doing so, it is necessary to address claims 
that Wilson was out of touch with recent trends in Admiralty strategic 
thought. In order to do so, a brief re-assessment of Admiralty planning 
under Admiral Sir John Fisher, Wilson’s predecessor, is required.
Historians have long criticised Admiralty planning under Fisher, 
arguing that no consistent consideration of strategic issues occurred 
under his leadership, and that such war plans as were produced were 
often intended to deflect criticism of Fisher’s regime, rather than to 
be genuine representations of naval strategic thought.61 Indeed, some 
historians have recently claimed that this duplicity was symptomatic 
57 TNA, CAB 16/9A, CID, Report and Proceedings of the Beresford Enquiry, pp. 307–8.
58 Fisher to Hankey, 29 Aug. 1911, quoted in Mackay, Fisher, pp. 430–1, and Hankey, Supreme 
Command, i. 83.
59 TNA, CAB 16/9A, CID, Beresford Enquiry, p. 291.
60 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 205–8.
61 See, for example, Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vols. i–iv; Kemp, ed., Fisher, vol. ii, 
pp. xii and 316–17; P. Haggie, ‘The Royal Navy and War Planning in the Fisher Era’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, viii (1973), pp. 113–31; Mackay, Fisher; N. d’Ombrain, War Machinery and 
High Policy: Defence Administration in Peacetime Britain (Oxford, 1973), p. 157; Kennedy, Rise 
and Fall, p. 234; Rodger, The Admiralty, pp.  125–6; Offer, Agrarian Interpretation, pp. 235–6; 
P. Hayes, ‘Britain, Germany, and the Admiralty’s Plans for Attacking German Territory, 1906–
1915’, in L. Freedman, P. Hayes and R. O’Neill, eds., War, Strategy, and International Politics: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Michael Howard (Oxford, 1992), pp. 95–116; Strachan, First World War, 
i. 379–80 and 394; and Hamilton, Making of the Modern Admiralty, pp. 222–4.
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of Fisher’s desire to keep his ‘radical’ ideas on naval strategy secret 
and to limit opposition to his reforms.62 Despite these criticisms, 
scholars have agreed that Fisher oversaw a move away from the Navy’s 
traditional strategy of close blockade. Marder argued that, while he did 
not abandon operations against the German coastline entirely, Fisher 
had ‘no great use’ for close blockade after his appointment as First 
Sea Lord in 1904.63 More recently Nicholas Lambert has taken this 
argument further, suggesting that Fisher scrapped attempts to control 
the German coastline in favour of his ‘revolutionary’ new strategy of 
flotilla defence.64 In Lambert’s analysis, any return to a close blockade 
in 1911 was thus almost diametrically opposed to the trends in naval 
strategic thought under Fisher.65
However, recent scholarship has demonstrated that both Marder’s 
original account and subsequent alternative explanations are open 
to question.66 In his recent reconsideration of Admiralty strategic 
planning in the First World War period, Shawn T. Grimes has shown 
how, through the introduction of countervailing weapons systems, 
infrastructure and tactical approaches, the Admiralty remained 
confident in the Navy’s ability to continue to conduct extensive 
operations off enemy ports, without exposing valuable capital ships 
to torpedo attack. This was to be achieved by the development of 
the torpedo boat destroyer, the construction of a series of protected 
anchorages in which the Fleet could shelter, and by improvements in 
communication and co-ordination.67 The development of British naval 
strategy after 1900 was thus considerably more complex than Marder’s 
deterministic narrative suggested.
Aspects of Lambert’s interpretation of British naval strategy under 
Fisher have also been challenged. The undeniable reality that Fisher 
worked consistently to concentrate the Navy’s most modern armoured 
warships in home waters after 1904 is incompatible with Lambert’s 
claim that Fisher intended to rely primarily upon his strategy of flotilla 
defence to prevent a German attack on the British Isles. In fact, it 
emerges that Fisher viewed the Navy’s capital ships—including the 
new Dreadnought and Invincible class vessels—as vital to the defence 
of the British Isles. The First Lord intended to deploy the Fleet’s most 
62 J.T. Sumida, ‘Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: The Sources of Naval Mythology’, 
Journal of Military History, lix (1995), pp. 619–37; Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 189–94; 
Lambert, Planning Armageddon, pp.  70–80; and C.  Martin, ‘The 1907 Naval War Plans and 
the Second Hague Peace Conference: A Case of Propaganda’, Journal of Strategic Studies, xxviii 
(2005), pp. 833–56.
63 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i. 369.
64 Lambert, ‘Flotilla Defence’, and Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 10, 116–17, 121–6, 
162–4, 174–6, 183–4.
65 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 201–11; Lambert, ‘Transformation and Technology’, 
pp.  286–8; Lambert, ‘Strategic Command and Control’, pp.  389–92; and Lambert, Planning 
Armageddon, pp. 132–7 and 150–5.
66 Grimes, War Planning, chs. 1–2.
67 Ibid., pp. 22–40.
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modern, powerful vessels into the North Sea in secret during a period of 
strained diplomatic relations, with the express purpose of intercepting 
any German military raid on the British Isles.68 These plans were the 
product of a lengthy investigation by the Admiralty, each stage of which 
confirmed the ongoing centrality of capital ships to planning for war 
against Germany.
In February 1907 Captain Edmond Slade, Head of the Naval War 
College, provided the Admiralty with a summary of recent strategic war 
games conducted under his supervision. Such exercises were commonly 
used to inform planning and the Admiralty often dictated the scenarios 
to be tested.69 Slade’s report emphasised that ‘the importance of always 
having a strong force in the North Sea cannot be overrated.’70 Towards 
the end of that year, a covert committee of four captains was formed at 
the College to investigate the detail of such a force. This body, under 
the chairmanship of Captain Sydney Fremantle, was given the task of 
investigating the correct position ‘for our battleships’ during a period of 
strained relations with Germany.71 That the Admiralty considered the 
armoured units of the Home Fleet, rather than its flotilla and submarine 
forces, as the vital factor in securing the British position in the North 
Sea was confirmed soon thereafter. Upon receiving the report of the 
Fremantle Committee, Slade’s successor, Rear Admiral Robert S. Lowry, 
forwarded its recommendations to the Admiralty. In an accompanying 
letter Lowry endorsed the Committee’s recommendations. He 
advocated grouping ‘3 to 6 of our fastest battleships, based on Rosyth, 
putting to a sea rendez-vous on strained relations’ to frustrate a surprise 
invasion attempt, with the Channel Fleet held ready ‘to be the force 
to deal the smashing blow.’72 Early the following year, Slade (now 
Director of Naval Intelligence) issued orders to the Home Fleet which 
outlined its role as the ‘North Sea Guard’ during the opening moves of 
an Anglo-German war.73 That Fisher continued to view the presence 
of capital ships in the North Sea as vital in the event of Anglo-German 
hostilities seems clear. If any lingering uncertainty on this point did 
remain, it was dispelled by new war plans issued in early 1909. These 
plans were unambiguous in their instruction to the C-in-C Home Fleet 
68 Morgan-Owen, ‘Exploded Ideas’. See also M.S. Seligmann, ‘The Renaissance of Pre-First 
World War Naval History’, Journal of Strategic Studies, xxxvi (2013), pp. 454–79.
69 A. Lambert, ‘The Naval War Course, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and the Origins 
of “The British Way in Warfare”’, in Neilson and Kennedy, eds., British Way in Warfare, pp. 228–
35 and 236–8.
70 Portsmouth, National Museum of the Royal Navy [hereafter NMRN], Crease Papers, 
individually unnumbered by new catalogue system, contained in box including MSS 253/20–32 
(labeled ‘Box 2, number 7’ under previous catalogue), Slade to Fisher, 11 Feb. 1907 in ‘War Plans’, 
pp. 21–2.
71 Greenwich, National Maritime Museum [hereafter NMM], Fremantle Papers, FRE/321/2, 
Report of the Fremantle Committee, 18 Dec. 1907, p. 6, inside docket, ‘Captain S.R. Fremantle’.
72 NMM, FRE/321/2, Lowry to Slade, 24 Dec. 1907, pp. 3–4.
73 TNA, ADM 116/1043B II, fos. 86–8, Admiralty, ‘Strained Relations. Scheme A’ and fos. 
106–7, Admiralty, ‘Scheme B’.
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regarding the necessity of maintaining a predominant force of British 
armoured warships in the North Sea under all circumstances:
Should a portion of the German Fleet evade his vigilance and escape into 
the Channel, he may detach such forces in pursuit as may be necessary to 
assist the THIRD FLEET in defeating them, but he must always maintain 
in the North Sea a force of capital ships superior to those of the enemy 
remaining in those waters.74
The plans were equally explicit about their intention to mass British 
destroyers ‘on the German Coast and at the entrance to the Baltic’ in 
order to establish ‘a close and perpetual surveillance’ of all potential 
points of German access to the North Sea. These documents strongly 
suggest that existing depictions of Admiralty strategic planning under 
Fisher are incomplete.75
As the supposed contrast between planning under Fisher and Wilson 
has underwritten the remaining criticisms of the latter’s performance in 
August 1911, it is therefore necessary to engage in a brief reconsideration 
of the course of Admiralty strategic planning in the last years of the 
Fisher regime. Grimes’ recent work has illustrated that, after initially 
projecting aggressive inshore operations against the German North 
Sea coastline between 1902 and 1906, the naval leadership intended 
to rely upon a more conservative ‘observational’ blockade by 1907. 
Such an approach was characterised by the use of flotilla craft to 
watch enemy exits, while the Fleet remained at a distance, safe from 
the action of enemy torpedo craft. The Fleet might close towards the 
German coastline during daytime, as the flotilla was considered capable 
of suppressing local defending forces for a limited period, but would 
necessarily remain distant during the night, when small torpedo boats 
might issue forth from port undetected.76 The documents suggest that 
this policy remained in place until mid-1908, as was demonstrated 
by a new war plan, W.1, issued in June of that year. Highlighting the 
seriousness with which Wilson’s strategic views were taken in planning 
circles, war plan W.1. stated in its preamble that:
Sir Arthur Wilson after six years’ experience in command of the Channel 
Fleet, advocates that, on the outbreak of war with Germany, our battle 
fleets should, as a rule, be kept well away from the German coast, and from 
possible interference by hostile torpedo craft. This principle is undoubtedly 
sound, since it must be Germany’s endeavour to reach these fleets with 
her torpedo craft, and so try and redress the balance of strength which is 
at present against her. It must be remembered, however, that this general 
rule does not preclude any temporary forward movement which may be 
necessary for the purpose of covering some minor offensive operation.
74 NMRN, Crease Papers, MS 253/84/3, Admiralty, ‘War’, p. 3 in ‘War Plan G.U. War Orders 
for The Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet’, 1909.
75 Morgan-Owen, ‘Exploded Ideas’.
76 TNA, ADM 116/900B, Admiralty, ‘Organization of Torpedo Craft for War’, 6 May 1905.
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For the same reasons Sir Arthur Wilson makes a general proposal to place 
no great force of ships opposite the mouths of the German rivers; these 
rivers should, however, be closely observed by a few cruisers and destroyers, 
to give notice of any war vessels which issue from them.77
However, it appears that during the second half of 1908 the Admiralty 
began to reconsider the desirability of more extensive inshore 
operations. Manoeuvres conducted in October 1908 attempted to 
gauge the number of British destroyers that would be required to 
assure local control over the primary waterways on the German 
North Sea coastline; the estuaries of the rivers Elbe, Weser and Jade.78 
Concurrent with the manoeuvres, plans were drafted to form a pair 
of artificial refuelling stations off the German coastline, to facilitate 
the maintenance of a numerical superiority of British flotilla craft and 
submarines in the region for an extended period.79 An updated set of 
war plans, drafted in September, provided a clear indication of the 
course of strategic thought at the Admiralty during the second half of 
1908. This document, designated as war plan W.3., projected a ‘closer 
blockade of the German North Sea Coast’ than had been envisaged in 
the preceding plans.80 This trend towards a ‘closer’ blockade clearly runs 
counter to the argument that developments in underwater technology 
gradually rendered such operations steadily more unrealistic after 1900. 
However, accusations that contemporary planners simply did not 
understand the implications of underwater weaponry for their schemes 
are unfounded.81 The Admiralty was keenly aware of the dangers that 
torpedoes and mines posed to British control of the North Sea: in 
December 1908 Fisher explained that it would be ‘suicidal’ to expose any 
of the armoured warships of the Fleet to torpedo attack.82 Indeed, it was 
for this very reason that the Admiralty considered a return to a ‘closer’ 
blockade as essential, as they viewed developing the maximum possible 
concentration of British flotilla craft against the German coastline vital 
to ‘keeping in’ hostile torpedo boats, thereby safeguarding the British 
Fleet from underwater attack.83 In December 1908, Fisher outlined his 
intention to mass eighty-three destroyers off the German coastline in 
order to fulfil this aim.84 That the Admiralty revived close blockade in 
77 TNA, ADM 116/1043B II, fo. 732, Admiralty, ‘War Plan. Germany. W.1.’, June 1908, p. 2.
78 TNA, ADM 116/1037, Bridgeman to Commodore (T), 31 Oct. 1908; Grimes, War Planning, 
p. 135.
79 TNA, ADM 116/1043B II, fos. 795–6, Admiralty, ‘Appendix to War Plan. Germany W.2.’, 
June 1908, pp. 5–6.
80 TNA, ADM 116/1043B II, fo. 815, Admiralty, ‘War Plan. England and France v. Germany. 
W.3. (Part I)’, Sept. 1908, p. 17.
81 For such accusations, see Kemp, ed., Fisher, ii, and Haggie, ‘War Planning in the Fisher Era’.
82 TNA, ADM 116/1043B I, fo. 4, Fisher, ‘War Plans and the Distribution of the Fleet’, Dec. 
1908, p. 3.
83 Grimes, War Planning, pp. 129–38.
84 TNA, ADM 116/1043B I, fo. 16, Appendix to Fisher, ‘War Plans’.
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1908–9 in order to combat the risk of torpedo attack on the Fleet was 
confirmed in the series of plans (‘G.U.’) issued early the following year.
The October 1908 flotilla craft exercises and Fisher’s December 1908 
paper on ‘War Plans’ were part of the process behind the production of 
a new series of war plans for the Fleet in late 1908. Fisher safeguarded 
the secrecy of the new plans fiercely, warning the First Lord, Reginald 
McKenna, that it would be ‘manifestly impossible’ to discuss their 
content at the forthcoming CID ‘Beresford Enquiry’ into Admiralty 
policy.85 Until recently, no copy of the plans to which Fisher referred 
was known to have survived.86 Fortuitously, however, Fisher’s naval 
secretary, Captain Thomas Crease, preserved a complete copy of the 
plans to which the First Sea Lord referred in his private papers. These 
documents confirm that Fisher envisaged deploying the largest possible 
number of flotilla craft and submarines against the German coastline, 
precisely in order that the armoured units of the British Fleet could 
traverse the North Sea, free from the danger of hostile torpedo attack. 
In turn, this would enable the Fleet to provide the necessary support to 
the flotilla craft observing the German coast. The plans explained that:
the number of destroyers and submarines that can be constantly maintained 
on the German Coast will exceed the total number possessed by Germany, 
and therefore there should be little risk bringing the squadrons [of battleships 
and cruisers] closer to the German Coast.87
Fisher informed McKenna that both Admiral Sir William May and 
Vice-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, respectively the commanders 
of the Home and Atlantic Fleets and the most senior naval officers then 
afloat, both concurred with the plans.88 The detail of the dispositions 
outlined in the 1909 war plans is illustrated in an extensive series of 
charts, the provenance of which has hitherto not been appreciated, 
which are preserved in Fisher’s private papers (see Figure 1).
Despite being a renowned advocate of underwater weaponry, Fisher 
had thus adopted a war plan predicated upon a close investment against 
the German coastline in order to limit the danger that German torpedo 
craft posed to the British Fleet in late 1908. As we shall see, Wilson 
inherited these plans when he succeeded Fisher in early 1910.89 The 
principle of adopting an increasingly aggressive strategy in order to 
gain control over the German littoral and to limit the danger posed 
by modern weaponry to British forces operating in the North Sea was 
firmly established before Wilson arrived at the Admiralty in January 
1910. Critiques which suggest that Wilson had contradicted recent 
85 CAC, McKenna Papers, MCKN 6/2, Fisher to McKenna, 19 Apr. 1909, p. 8.
86 See Morgan-Owen, ‘Exploded Ideas’.
87 NMRN, Admiralty, ‘War’, p. 7, in ‘War Plan G.U.’.
88 CAC, MCKN 6/2, Fisher to McKenna, 19 Apr. 1909, p. 7.
89 NMM, Oliver Papers, OLV/12, H. Oliver, ‘Volume II of Recollections, written in 1946, 
covering period 1901–1939’, p. 65.
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Admiralty planning are, therefore, dubious: his statements regarding 
the necessity of ‘keeping in’ German destroyers were in line with 
the course of recent naval strategic thought. However, this leaves 
several important questions unanswered—notably why, when he had 
Figure 1: Planned dispositions of the British Fleet in the event of war, 1909; 
based on one of the charts accompanying the 1909 G.U. War Plans, in CAC, 
Fisher of Kilverstone Papers, FISR 13/6, Chart War: III, 1909.
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previously opposed such plans, Wilson revived the close blockade in 
August 1911 and how he intended to meet the danger that German 
submarines would surely pose to such a strategy? In order to address 
these points, we shall now turn our attention to the manner in which 
Wilson’s strategic views evolved to meet developments in the situation 
in the North Sea after he arrived at the Admiralty in January 1910.
II
While the evidence relating to Admiralty war planning under Wilson 
is fragmentary at best, the surviving documents suggest that he 
remained opposed to extensive inshore operations when he arrived at 
the Admiralty in early 1910. After becoming First Sea Lord, Wilson 
commissioned the newly-formed Admiralty War Division to set about 
editing the war plans he had inherited from Fisher.90 Captain Henry 
Oliver, who remained in post as the First Sea Lord’s naval assistant 
during the transition from Fisher to Wilson, later recalled how ‘the 1st 
Sea Lord [Fisher] locked up the plans in his safe and when Sir Arthur 
Wilson relieved him in 1910 he soon scrapped them and made better 
plans.’91 These plans took the remainder of 1910 to be drawn up and, 
when finally ready, it appears that they contained provision for a more 
limited deployment of force off the German coastline.92 By ‘scrapping’ 
Fisher’s 1909  ‘G.U.’ plans, Wilson demonstrated that he retained his 
previously stated reservations about close blockade as late as January 
1911, only eight months before the CID meeting of 23 August.93 Fisher, 
who remained keenly interested in naval developments during his 
enforced retirement, discussed Wilson’s proposed strategy with him in 
the autumn of 1910.94 Soon afterwards, he expressed his reservations 
about Wilson’s plans to the C-in-C Atlantic Fleet, Vice-Admiral Sir 
John Jellicoe:
hardly anyone but yourself … clearly realizes the immense alteration in both 
tactics and strategy which the development of the submarine now causes. 
I  am quite sure A.K. Wilson don’t [sic] realize it, from our conversation 
together when he was last at Kilverstone.95
Fisher’s suggestion that Wilson did not comprehend the strategic 
implications of underwater weaponry has doubtless contributed to the 
90 S.R. Fremantle, My Naval Career, 1880–1928 (London, 1949), p. 151.
91 NMM, OLV/12, Oliver, ‘Recollections’ II, p. 65.
92 Fremantle, My Naval Career, pp. 154–5; TNA, ADM 116/3096, Admiral May, ‘Heligoland 
Bight Blockade Squadron: Preliminary War Orders for Commodore T. in Command’, 23 Jan. 1911, 
p. 6; Grimes, War Planning, pp. 160–70.
93 Grimes, War Planning, pp. 163–6.
94 For the date of Wilson’s visit (24 Oct.), see Fisher to Mrs. R. McKenna, 26 Sept. 1910, in 
A.J. Marder, ed., Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord 
Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols., London, 1952–9), ii. 339.
95 Fisher to Jellicoe, 10 Jan. 1911, in ibid., ii. 349.
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impression that Wilson adopted his close blockade strategy as the result 
of a failure to appreciate the impact of new weapons systems. However, 
this is far from clear. Some nine months later Fisher defended Wilson’s 
capabilities as a strategist, confiding to a friend that ‘I believe I  am 
the only one he ever trusted with his plans’ and that the plans Wilson 
had outlined to him were ‘studied and perfect’.96 Since Fisher’s own 
solution to the prevailing strategic situation in the North Sea had been 
a closer investment against the German coastline, it is conceivable that, 
far from viewing Wilson as reckless for advocating a close blockade, 
Fisher actually viewed the plans Wilson had formed in early 1911 as 
being too cautious. This notion is supported by evidence suggesting 
that Wilson’s strategic views altered considerably during 1911.
Scholars have long been aware that, in his testimony to the CID 
on 23 August, Wilson had informed the sub-committee that ‘all the 
experience of recent manoeuvres showed that close blockade was 
necessary’ because ‘the safety of our Fleet depended upon preventing 
the German destroyers from getting out’.97 However, Nicholas 
Lambert has demonstrated that Wilson’s decision to revive the strategy 
of ‘close blockade’ was motivated by a desire to prevent both German 
destroyers and submarines from ‘getting out’ into the North Sea.98 
While Wilson did not explicitly link his advocacy of close blockade 
with the need to contain German submarines at the meeting on 23 
August, he subsequently did so, and Lambert has convincingly proven 
the existence of an intimate relationship between Wilson’s advocacy of a 
close blockade and his desire to limit the danger of German submarines 
in the North Sea.99 However, Lambert has criticised the First Sea Lord’s 
reasoning: ‘the ideas Wilson expressed at the 114th CID meeting were 
very much his own and most certainly did not reflect current Admiralty 
policy’.100 Lambert’s critique hinges upon a series of manoeuvres 
that the Navy conducted during the summer of 1911. He asserts that 
these exercises had conclusively demonstrated that the presence of 
submarine boats in a port under blockade would render the position 
of the blockading force untenable, but that Wilson ‘simply would not 
listen’ to the warnings of subordinates in this regard.101 However, the 
documents can easily be seen to support an almost entirely opposite 
viewpoint as to the key lessons of the manoeuvres.
During June and July 1911 the Admiralty conducted a series of 
exercises between the Navy’s coastal defence flotillas, including a 
number of ‘C’ class submarines, and a combined force of destroyers and 
armoured vessels from the 3rd and 4th Divisions of the Home Fleet. Far 
96 Fisher to Arnold White, 10 Nov. 1911, in ibid., ii. 414–15, and Mackay, Fisher, pp. 430–1.
97 TNA, CAB 2/2, fo. 132, ‘Minutes of the 114th Meeting’, p.  14. This passage is quoted in 
Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i. 392.
98 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 205–8.
99 Ibid., pp. 208–11.
100 Lambert, Planning Armageddon, p. 154.
101 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, p. 209.
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from invalidating the principle of using aggressive inshore operations to 
reduce the danger from submarines as Lambert claims, these exercises in 
fact supported the use of such an approach. In order to appreciate this 
fact, an understanding of the practical difficulties involved in operating 
the submarine boats of this period is required. Before the exercises 
began in early June the Inspecting Captain of Submarine Boats (ICS), 
Roger Keyes, submitted a paper to the Admiralty outlining his views as 
to the best method of employing submarines in the defence of a port 
or stretch of coastline. This paper provides a series of insights into the 
realities of contemporary submarine operations vital to understanding 
the strategy Wilson outlined to the CID two months later. In his 
memorandum, Keyes informed the Admiralty that:
In order to get full value out of Submarines it is absolutely essential that 
they should dive before they are sighted by the enemy. In clear fine weather, 
provided a good look-out is kept, they should always be able to do so, 
and under such conditions it is preferable that Submarines should not be 
accompanied by surface craft … In hazy weather, such as often prevails in 
the North Sea, however, they are certain be seen and avoided by an enemy 
before they can get into a position to attack, and they also run a great 
risk of coming under gun-fire of fast vessels before they can dive. Under 
such weather conditions, or, when making a long passage when there is a 
possibility of falling in with the enemy, they should be accompanied by fast 
surface craft to scout for them.102
Keyes’s paper reveals that the extremely limited speed and visibility of 
contemporary submarines when submerged required them to leave port 
on the surface, leaving them acutely vulnerable to ‘fast vessels’ when 
putting to sea. Indeed, the boats would be so defenceless when leaving 
port that the Navy considered it necessary to escort its own submarines 
to sea with armoured cruisers. An aggressive inshore deployment of 
British destroyers—a close blockade—would thus stand a far greater 
chance of catching enemy submarines in their most exposed situation, 
on the surface in shallow coastal waters.
The summer manoeuvres bore out the difficulties that Keyes had 
alluded to in his paper. While records do not survive for all of the exercises 
conducted during the summer,103 those pertaining to the manoeuvres 
considered crucial by Lambert are retained in Keyes’s personal papers. 
Despite Keyes’s subsequent claims that ‘the most ardent supporter of 
the close blockade could have been left in no doubt as to the menace of 
submarines to such a disposition’, the documents he preserved present 
a very different picture of the outcome of the exercises.104 In fact, due 
102 British Library [hereafter BL], Keyes Papers, Add. MS 82456, Keyes, ‘Submarines’, 3 June 
1911, pp. 2–3.
103 Additional exercises were conducted later in the month; see TNA, ADM 144/34, Admiralty 
Mobilisation Department, ‘Precis’.
104 R. Keyes, The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes I The Narrow Seas to 
the Dardanelles, 1910–15 (London, 1934), p. 42.
 by guest on June 28, 2015
http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EHR
Page 23 of 42Sir Arthur WilSon’S WAr Pl An
to what one officer described as ‘sharp practice’ on the part of the 
blockading destroyers, who simply positioned themselves stationary 
in the approaches to the port at which the submarines were based, 
blocking their attempts to get to sea and refusing to heed signals that 
they had been ruled ‘out of action’ by the armoured cruisers escorting 
the submarines, the manoeuvres were something of a farce.105 Indeed, 
four days later, in a report he made to Rear-Admiral Lewis Bayly, the 
officer in command of the exercises, Keyes was obliged to make the 
striking admission that ‘the submarines accomplished nothing’.106 
This statement is markedly different from the description of the 
exercises which Keyes later developed in his memoirs. That the ICS 
had considerable faith in the ability of his charges to get to sea past 
an inshore squadron is clear: he believed that the craft could simply 
dive under blockading destroyers, if the channel was deep enough;107 or 
that, once submerged, the boats might be able to navigate through an 
inshore destroyer force unseen.108 However, despite his enthusiasm for 
submarines, in the aftermath of the 1911 summer manoeuvres he was 
nevertheless forced to concede that:
One point much emphasized was the great risk submarines run of being 
caught on the surface in thick weather if they are unaccompanied by surface 
craft to scout for them.109
This obliged Keyes to repeat his earlier recommendation that 
submarines ought to be accompanied to sea by armoured cruisers for 
the boats’ protection from enemy destroyers and light cruisers:
I am sure the principle acted on is the correct one, and that when it is desired 
to get a Flotilla of submarines out to sea they should be accompanied by 
Armoured Cruisers.110
Finally, the ICS also revealed to Bayly that, even if the submarines did 
get to sea, the presence of a large number of destroyers would render 
their task in sighting and attacking enemy capital ships extremely 
difficult:
I would add … that the presence of a large number of Destroyers in the 
vicinity of the objective is most trying and objectionable to the submarine.111
Thus, the exercises highlighted the acute vulnerability of surfaced 
submarines to such an extent that the Navy considered it vital to 
escort its own craft out to sea if visibility was limited. Furthermore, the 
105 BL, Add. MS 82456, Sandeman to Keyes, 30 June 1911, p. 4.
106 BL, Add. MS 82456, Keyes to Bayly, 3 July 1911, p. 1.
107 BL, Add. MS 82456, Keyes, ‘Submarines’, 3 June 1911, pp. 3–4.
108 BL, Add. MS 82456, Keyes to Bayly, 3 July 1911, pp. 2–3.
109 BL, Add. MS 82456, Keyes to Bayly, 1 July 1911, p. 4.
110 Ibid., p. 3.
111 Ibid., p. 4.
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manoeuvres confirmed that the boats would be vulnerable in shallow 
water or in narrow channels, such as those in the German estuaries,112 
where the underwater evasion of the more freely moving, shallow draft 
destroyers would be difficult. Finally, even if the boats did get to sea 
and locate a target, the presence of a large number of destroyers made 
the boats’ task in approaching close enough to engage significantly 
more difficult.
Conducted as they were around six weeks before Wilson made his 
presentation to the CID, the experience of the Navy’s 1911 ‘blockade’ 
manoeuvres appear to have been a key factor in convincing Wilson 
to abandon his earlier reservations regarding extensive operations 
off the German coastline. It seems that, upon reading the reports of 
the exercises, Wilson was sufficiently impressed by the potential of 
using inshore destroyer patrols to prevent German submarines from 
getting to sea that he revived the key characteristics of Fisher’s 1909 
war plans. The Admiralty kept detailed reports on the progress of 
German submarine construction and knew that the German navy had 
a maximum of ten serviceable boats available in mid-1911.113 Wilson 
clearly considered that an aggressive inshore strategy would be an 
appropriate countermeasure against such a limited number of vessels. 
Thus, when he informed the CID on 23 August that ‘all the experience 
of recent manoeuvres showed that close blockade was necessary’, the 
First Sea Lord was not disregarding the evidence of the Navy’s recent 
exercises. Rather, he was demonstrating an understanding of the 
practical limitations of operating submarine boats that eluded both the 
members of the sub-committee who witnessed his presentation and 
subsequent scholars alike. Indeed, the manner in which Wilson saw 
fit to commission the manoeuvres and then rapidly integrated their 
findings into the Navy’s war plans demonstrated an all too rare instance 
of the potential efficacy of his administration at the Admiralty. It also 
served to highlight the continuity of Admiralty planning between the 
Fisher and Wilson regimes: both men, when faced with the challenge of 
waging naval war against Germany in the North Sea, ultimately arrived 
at the same strategy of ‘closer’ blockade.
Significant problems undoubtedly did remain with the plan Wilson 
outlined to the CID in August 1911. Nonetheless, the naval aspects of 
the strategy that Wilson described did not indicate a refusal to accept 
the realities of modern naval warfare, or a failure to appreciate the 
strategic significance of innovations in underwater technology. Wilson’s 
inability to articulate the rationale behind his plans was a mark of his 
112 The Admiralty had conducted detailed hydrographic investigations into the feasibility of 
using block ships to seal such channels under Fisher’s regime, and was thus well aware of the 
nature of the German river estuaries. See Grimes, War Planning, pp. 55–6, 61–2, 122–3 and 136–7.
113 M.S. Seligmann, Spies in Uniform: British Military and Naval Intelligence on the Eve of 
the First World War (Oxford, 2006), pp. 132–42; TNA, ADM 137/3905, NID, ‘Notes on German 
Submarine Construction 1902 to 1912’, entry for 25 Aug. 1911.
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weakness as a spokesperson and political operator, rather than as a 
strategist. The contrast between the Admiral’s opaque performance and 
the polished presentation delivered by the urbane Director of Military 
Operations, Brigadier General Henry Wilson, doubtless contributed 
to the poor impression that it made.114 Forced into early retirement 
in December, Wilson acknowledged to his replacement upon leaving 
the Admiralty that ‘Churchill & the solider element…beat him’ at the 
CID.115 Yet this did not spell the end of Wilson’s involvement with 
either the Admiralty or the CID.
III
After Churchill removed Wilson from the Admiralty in December 1911, 
the Admiral retained his seat on the CID. It was during his continued 
service on this body that Wilson finally articulated the reasoning 
behind his close blockade plan which had failed to convince the 
government on 23 August.116 In 1913 the CID announced the formation 
of a new sub-committee to re-examine the issue of home defence. The 
sub-committee sat throughout the rest of the year, finally calling its 
expert naval witnesses during the autumn and winter of 1913. It was 
at a meeting of this body on 3 December that Wilson argued his case 
that inshore operations represented the most realistic solution to the 
challenge posed by German submarines:117
I think the advent of the submarine is the reason which makes the close 
blockade absolutely necessary, and that the Admiralty must put its wits 
together to see how they will keep that close blockade, or else the submarine 
will get out. The principal danger is the submarine which will get out, and if 
you cannot keep up your blockade … that is the base of the whole thing.118
However, by the time that Wilson made these statements in December 
1913, they represented a critique of current planning: the Admiralty had 
felt compelled to abandon attempts to enact a close investment of the 
German coastline eighteen months earlier, due to increases in German 
naval capability.
The operational strength of the German navy had grown rapidly 
after 1908–9 as Tirpitz’s building programme produced an increasing 
number of modern warships.119 This had the effect of reducing Britain’s 
superiority relative to Germany and consequently placed increasing 
114 CAC, AGDF 2/1, fos. 92–3, Grant-Duff diary, 25 Aug. 1911.
115 Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Eng. Hist. 768, fo. 13, Bridgeman to Sandars, 12 Jan. 1915.
116 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, p. 208.
117 Ibid., pp. 207–8.
118 TNA, CAB 16/28A, fos. 160–1, Report and Proceedings of Sub-Committee on Overseas 
Attack, pp. 311–12.
119 See H.  Herwig, ‘Luxury’ Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918 (London, 1987), 
pp. 54–92.
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constraints upon the nature of the operations that the Admiralty 
considered feasible in the event of an Anglo-German war. As early as 
1908, Rear-Admiral John Jellicoe, the Third Sea Lord, had anticipated 
that, if the current pace of construction remained fixed, a comparison 
of the two navies in April 1912 would reveal that ‘the position is one 
of great risk’.120 Rear-Admiral Lewis Bayly, the Head of the Naval 
War College, concurred with his colleague’s assessment. In 1909 Bayly 
prepared an appreciation of the strategic situation in the event of a war 
between Britain and Germany in which he echoed Jellicoe’s concerns:
After a close examination of the comparative strength of Great Britain and 
Germany in battleships and Armoured Cruisers in 1911, the conclusion 
arrived at is that our Battleship and Cruiser strength is only just sufficient 
to ensure success.121
Increases in the pace of British construction after 1909 would ultimately 
secure the Navy’s preponderance in terms of capital ships, but the vessels 
ordered at this stage would not begin to enter commission until 1913–14 
at the earliest. In the interim, the Admiralty was obliged to attempt to 
decrease its commitment to the Mediterranean in order to concentrate 
sufficient modern capital ships in home waters to preserve a suitable 
margin of superiority.122 Similarly, the steady growth of the German cruiser, 
torpedo boat (as the German Navy called its destroyers) and submarine 
establishments meant that maintaining a constant British presence off 
the enemy coastline became increasingly difficult after 1910–11. The 
Admiralty had monitored the steady expansion of the German destroyer 
force closely since the early 1900s123 and considered the issue to be a matter 
of the highest priority.124 Successive naval attachés were detailed to devote 
close attention to developments in the German destroyer establishment 
and, as a result, the Admiralty was well aware that the Imperial German 
Navy could boast more than 100 such vessels by 1909.125 This posed a 
serious challenge to Britain’s ability to mount continuous operations off 
the German coastline, since doing so would require a significant margin 
of numerical superiority over the German destroyer force, due to the 
logistical difficulties involved in operating at a significant distance from 
home ports. Furthermore, on the basis of intelligence regarding German 
plans to operate destroyers in conjunction with their main fleet,126 the 
Admiralty came to view destroyers as necessary adjuncts to the British 
120 BL, Jellicoe Papers, Add. MS 48990, fo. 59, Jellicoe, ‘Strength of the Tail’, 1908.
121 TNA, ADM 116/1043B II, fo. 160, L. Bayly, ‘Sketch of the Action Necessary for War with 
Germany Alone’, 1909.
122 C.M. Bell, ‘Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the 
Admiralty, 1911–1914’, War in History, xviii (2011), pp. 333–56.
123 See BL, Arnold-Forster Papers, Add MS 50296, fos. 53–4, H.O. Arnold-Forster, ‘Destroyers, 
New Type Required: Inefficiency of Present Type’, 30 Mar. 1903.
124 Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, pp. 132–6.
125 TNA, ADM 116/1043B II, fo. 166, Bayly, ‘England v France and Germany’, 1909.
126 Seligmann, Spies in Uniform, pp. 134–5.
 by guest on June 28, 2015
http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EHR
Page 27 of 42Sir Arthur WilSon’S WAr Pl An
battle fleet.127 Only the largest, most seaworthy British boats could fulfil 
this role, further limiting the number and quality of destroyers available 
for operations off the German coastline.
Finally, the growth of the German submarine arm, which could boast 
fifteen vessels by the spring of 1912,128 threatened the armoured vessels 
required to support the inshore destroyer screen. Thus, just as the British 
superiority in armoured warships narrowed and the Admiralty reduced 
the level of risk to which it was prepared to expose its high-value units, 
the threat to large ships operating near the German coastline appeared 
to increase. As a result of this combination of factors, the First Sea Lord, 
Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, was obliged reluctantly to inform the 
Fleet in April 1912 that ‘the Blockade by the British Fleet of the whole 
German Coast on the North Sea is to be considered as cancelled.’129 His 
reasons for doing so were articulated later in the year by the Director 
of the Operations Division, Captain George Ballard: ‘submarines, 
torpedo craft, and mines are a constant menace to the blockaders’ and 
‘under such conditions … an effective watch is virtually impossible’.130
In place of deploying vessels off the German coastline, the Admiralty 
had continued to experiment during 1912 with a series of mid-North 
Sea patrols, none of which approached within a hundred miles of the 
German coastline and which were thus of no use in preventing the exit 
of German submarines into the North Sea. This had resulted in the 
Admiralty becoming increasingly hesitant to deploy the Fleet towards 
the German coastline, since, in the absence of any inshore operations 
against the German exits, hostile submarines, destroyers and torpedo 
craft could penetrate deep into the North Sea without the C-in-C or 
the Admiralty knowing of their whereabouts.
Churchill grew frustrated with the apparent inability of any of his 
professional advisors to offer any practical solution to this problem.131 In 
February 1913 he chided the new First Sea Lord, Admiral Prince Louis 
of Battenberg: ‘it is impossible by a purely passive defence to guard 
against all the dangers wh[ich] may be threatened by an enterprising 
enemy.’132 Attempting to recapture some of the strategic initiative of 
earlier naval administrations, Churchill formed his own improvised 
group of planners, distinct from the Admiralty War Staff, to generate 
new schemes and ideas.133 One of the officers included in this group 
127 J. Brooks, ‘Grand Battle-Fleet Tactics: From the Edwardian Age to Jutland’, in R.J. Blyth, 
A.  Lambert and J.  Rüger, eds., The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age (Farnham, 2011), 
pp. 183–211.
128 TNA, ADM 137/3905, NID ‘Notes on German Submarine Construction’, entry entitled 
‘Programme of Construction of Submarines’.
129 TNA, ADM 116/3096, Admiralty to Callaghan, Apr. 1912.
130 TNA, ADM 116/866B, fo. 285, Ballard, ‘Remarks on War Orders for an Observational 
Force in the North Sea in connection with the lessons of the 1912 Manoeuvres’, 16 Sept. 1912, p. 1.
131 Grimes, War Planning, pp.  181–9; C.M. Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford, 2013), 
pp. 37–8.
132 TNA, ADM 116/3412, Churchill to Battenberg, 17 Feb. 1913.
133 Grimes, War Planning, p. 183.
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was Rear-Admiral Lewis Bayly. Bayly had played an active part in the 
formation of Fisher’s ambitious 1909 war plans during his time as Head 
of the Naval War College134 and, as we have seen, had subsequently 
been the senior officer present at the 1911 ‘blockade’ manoeuvres that 
had informed the strategy which Wilson presented to the CID on 23 
August. As such, he was ideally placed to present the benefits of a more 
aggressive strategy, although it is unclear whether Churchill selected 
him on this basis. What we can say with certainty is that in January 
1913 Churchill instructed Bayly to be ‘prepared to investigate and report 
on the question of seizing a base on the Dutch, German, Danish or 
Scandinavian Coasts for operations of Flotillas on the outbreak of war 
with Germany.’135 Bayly duly provided him with the view that such 
operations were of vital importance. He explained that:
We cannot maintain sufficient observation force of light cruisers, and 
flotillas … unless we seize a convenient base on or close to the German 
coast, because we have nothing like enough vessels to do so, nor are we ever 
likely to have enough.136
Bayly’s logic was exactly that which had resulted in both Fisher’s move to 
a closer blockade in 1908–9 and in Wilson’s decision to revert to a close 
blockade in the summer of 1911. However, his paper did not impress 
either the Chief of the War Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, 
or Battenberg. The notion of seizing an advanced base also generated 
staunch opposition from Vice-Admiral Sir George Callaghan, the 
C-in-C of the Home Fleet, and other elements within the Admiralty 
planning apparatus.137 While naval officers were in general agreement 
regarding the desirability of capturing such a base, the consensus of 
opinion at the Admiralty was that such an operation would entail 
risks out of proportion to the potential rewards. The question of how 
best to resolve the strategic dilemma created by the abandonment of 
operations against the German coastline dominated the Admiralty’s 
strategic discourse until well after the outbreak of the War.138 The War 
Staff examined various solutions, including modified cruiser sweeps139 
and an expanded use of British submarines off the German coastline.140 
However, none of these contingencies were ready for implementation by 
134 NMM, OLV/12, Oliver, ‘Recollections’ II, p. 65.
135 TNA, ADM 137/452, fo. 7, Admiralty to Bayly, 31 Jan. 1913.
136 TNA, ADM 137/452, fo. 10, Bayly, ‘Remarks’, 17 Mar. 1913, p. 1.
137 Grimes, War Planning, pp. 184–9.
138 For more detail see D.G. Morgan-Owen, ‘An “Intermediate Blockade”? British North Sea 
Strategy, 1912–1914’, War in History, forthcoming, xxii (2015).
139 The key documents on this topic are located in TNA, ADM 1/8372/76, ADM 1/8239 and 
ADM 1/3088. Also see Morgan-Owen, ‘Intermediate Blockade’.
140 Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, pp. 288–91 and 294–6; C. Martin, ‘The Complexity of 
Strategy: “Jackie” Fisher and the Trouble with Submarines’, Journal of Military History, lxxv (2011), 
pp. 441–70; C.M. Bell, ‘Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered’, pp. 333–56; Bell, Churchill and 
Sea Power, pp. 34–8; C.M. Bell ‘On Standards and Scholarship: A Response to Nicholas Lambert’, 
War in History, xx (2013), pp. 381–409; and Morgan-Owen, ‘Intermediate Blockade’.
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mid-1914. Thus, in July 1914 it was decided to make a more expansive, if 
still limited, use of the Grand Fleet periodically to ‘sweep’ the North Sea. 
This strategy, based upon proposals Wilson had submitted after leaving 
the command of the Channel Fleet in 1907,141 consisted of traversing 
the North Sea in superior force in the hope that such movements 
would deter the Germans from making any meaningful sorties for fear 
of being overwhelmed.142 It was hoped that this approach would limit 
the danger of German raids or invasion and allow the Navy to continue 
to preserve British trade and to strangle the German economy from 
afar, without the risks involved in a close blockade. Such was the Navy’s 
strategy at the outbreak of war in August 1914.
IV
Within days of the outbreak of war, it became obvious that German 
submarines could operate further into the North Sea than had previously 
been appreciated. Vessels of the Grand Fleet reported submarine 
sightings in the latitude of the Orkneys within the opening week of the 
War: the light cruiser HMS Birmingham successfully rammed and sank 
one such craft on the morning of 9 August.143 The verifiable presence 
of enemy submarines so close to the Grand Fleet’s primary anchorage at 
Scapa Flow caused the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, 
a considerable degree of anxiety. His worries were magnified by reported 
sightings of an enemy submarine inside the anchorage on 1 September.144 
A second scare occurred six weeks later on 18 October. Such sightings 
suggested that the Germans had the capability to sink strategically 
vital British capital ships at anchor, even in northern harbours, and 
by so doing tilt the balance of power in the North Sea in their favour. 
This would have significant consequences for communications with 
the British Expeditionary Force on the Continent and with their 
French allies. It might also threaten Britain’s vital trade routes to the 
Empire and the rest of the world, without which the country could 
not effectively participate in the war. The gravity of the situation led 
the Admiralty to allow Jellicoe to remove his command to the west of 
Scotland on 19 October and to remain at Lough Swilly on the northern 
Irish coast for the remainder of the month, while improvised defences 
were hurriedly put in place at Scapa Flow.145 However, the removal of 
the Fleet to Ireland, remote from the North Sea, prejudiced the Navy’s 
ability to defend the vulnerable eastern coastline. After German battle 
141 Wilson, ‘Remarks on the War Plans’, in Kemp, ed., Fisher, ii. 455–8.
142 TNA, ADM 116/3096, Admiralty, ‘War Plans, Part I—General Instructions’, July 1914, p. 5.
143 TNA, ADM 137/414, fo. 13, Jellicoe, ‘8.0 a.m. Saturday, 8th, to 8.0 a.m., Sunday, 9th August’ 
in ‘G.F.N. August, 1914’.
144 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, ii. 66–7.
145 See entries in TNA, ADM 137/416, fos. 85–128, ‘G.F.N. October, 1914’ from 22–31 Oct. 
1914.
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cruisers succeeded in bombarding the coastal town of Yarmouth on 
3 November and escaped without loss, the pressure on Churchill to 
redress the situation in the North Sea intensified.146 Churchill chafed 
at the seeming impossibility of altering the unsatisfactory strategic 
situation in the North Sea. Temperamentally unsuited to presiding over 
a strategy of ‘steady pressure’,147 he attempted to revive earlier plans to 
seize an advanced base off the German coastline.
Churchill had in fact advocated schemes for amphibious operations 
against the German coastline even before the war began.148 However, 
the plans that he had put forward in July and August 1914 were far less 
ambitious than those Wilson had proposed in 1911 and did not involve 
attempts to try and exercise control over the entire German North 
Sea littoral. As Churchill had explained to his naval colleagues on 9 
August, by seizing an advanced base he hoped merely to ‘maintain an 
active surveillance’, ‘to give the destroyer flotillas a chance of fighting 
German destroyers by gunfire in their own waters’, and ‘to give the C 
class submarines a part in the oversea warfare from wh[ich] they are 
now excluded, & thus compensate to some extent for our deficiencies 
in numbers of big boats’.149 He made no mention of attempting to 
‘seal in’ German destroyers or submarines, as Fisher and Wilson had 
previously intended. Indeed, he appears to have viewed the capture 
of an advanced base and the closure of German exits to the North 
Sea as entirely distinct at this stage—as was demonstrated in a further 
memorandum on 19 August, in which he stated that blocking the Kiel 
Canal with sunken hulks was the only reliable means of ‘sealing in’ the 
German Fleet.150 Churchill’s initial wartime advocacy of amphibious 
operations was thus less ambitious than the plans that Wilson and 
Fisher had previously contemplated. However, as it became increasingly 
clear that the action of German submarines was beginning to dominate 
the strategic situation in the North Sea, Churchill began to consider 
alternative proposals. Rather than aiming simply to maintain an ‘active 
surveillance’, his goal became to find a solution to the problem of 
German submarine warfare.
This process began at some point in late August or early September, 
when Churchill and Battenberg discussed the desirability of seizing an 
advanced base with Sir Arthur Wilson.151 The precise reasons for the 
naval leadership meeting with the retired Admiral remain unclear. What 
we can say with certainty is that soon afterwards, on 10 September, 
146 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, ii. 130.
147 Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, p. 54.
148 TNA, ADM 137/452, fo. 137, Churchill to Asquith, 31 July 1914; Richmond diary, 9 
Aug. 1914, in A.J. Marder, Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond 
(London, 1952), p. 96.
149 TNA, ADM 137/452, fos. 208–10, Churchill to Battenberg and Sturdee, 9 Aug. 1914.
150 M. Gilbert, ed., The Churchill Documents VI At the Admiralty (1993; repr. Hillsdale, MI, 
2008), pp. 45–6, Churchill memorandum, 19 Aug. 1914.
151 TNA, ADM 137/452, fo. 212, Wilson, ‘The Capture of Heligoland’, 10 Sept. 1914, p. 1.
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Wilson submitted a lengthy paper to Churchill on the desirability of 
seizing an island off the German coastline. This document, presumably 
a summary of the discussion that had occurred days earlier, bore 
considerable resemblance to the plans Wilson had presented to the CID 
in August 1911, with several notable additions. As had been the case in 
1911, it was characterised by aggressive inshore operations intended to 
meet the threat of German submarines and torpedo craft in the coastal 
waters off the principal German ports. Marder, convinced that Wilson 
was ‘obsessed’ with capturing the Island of Heligoland, dismissed 
these proposals as unrealistic.152 However, to do so is to overlook the 
reasoning behind Wilson’s submission: as had been the case in 1911, Sir 
Arthur’s main focus was on finding an effective means of conducting 
anti-submarine operations in the shallow waters of the Heligoland 
Bight. After explaining his plans for seizing Heligoland, Wilson’s paper 
went on to spell out unambiguously the rationale behind his scheme:
The best method of destroying the enemy’s submarines is to lay and 
maintain mines systematically in the channels at the mouths of the rivers 
and this cannot be done while Heligoland commands the approaches. If we 
lay the mines the enemy would quickly sweep channels through them.153
Pre-empting questions regarding how to hold the island, Wilson 
explained that it might not be necessary to do so, given that ‘the best 
defence of the island would be the effective blocking of the rivers by 
mines and watching the entrances by Submarines so as to make it 
difficult and dangerous for the enemy to come out at all.’154 The seizure 
of Heligoland was not, therefore, central to Wilson’s scheme. Rather, 
his plan was defined by aggressive inshore anti-submarine measures. 
Indeed, it appears that Wilson was somewhat of a pioneer in this 
regard. The Director of the Intelligence Division, Rear-Admiral Oliver, 
later recalled that Sir Arthur had originated new techniques of mining 
intended specifically to counter the menace of German submarines as 
part of his scheme, claiming that Wilson had ‘invented anti-submarine 
mine nets and deep minefields’.155 The scheme Wilson proposed to 
Churchill in September 1914 was thus the culmination of the ideas 
he had formed as the result of the Navy’s 1911 ‘blockade’ manoeuvres: 
he advocated mounting a close blockade of the German exits in order 
to mine the narrow channels of the German river estuaries shut and 
to ‘seal in’ enemy submarines. As had been the case in August 1911, 
Wilson’s ideas were in line with the Navy’s own most recent thinking 
on anti-submarine warfare. Before the outbreak of war, the Admiralty 
Submarine Committee had recommended ‘a system of mining channels 
152 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, ii. 182–4.
153 TNA, ADM 137/452, fo. 218, Wilson, ‘Reasons for Capture of Heligoland’, 10 Sept. 1914, 
p. 7.
154 Ibid., p. 9, fo. 220.
155 NMM, OLV/12, Oliver, ‘Recollections’ II, p. 116.
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used by hostile submarines off their own ports’ as a potentially effective 
submarine counter-measure.156
The addition of an extensive inshore mining campaign to the plan 
Wilson had formed in 1911 had the additional benefit of reducing the 
need to support the British flotilla forces operating in the Bight with 
armoured warships, as mining would ‘seal in’ German surface craft 
and submarines alike. This formed a central aspect of Wilson’s 1914 
proposals.157 Crucially, from Churchill’s perspective, Wilson’s proposals 
thus contained the potential to remove the primary objection of the 
War Staff and senior Flag Officers to operations against the German 
coastline; namely that the Fleet would be obliged to run significant 
risks supporting such attacks. If successful, such an operation might 
transform the strategic situation in the North Sea and thus provide the 
government with a greater degree of flexibility in the distribution and 
employment of Britain’s naval and military resources—the desirability 
of which the Cabinet increasingly accepted as the winter drew on. 
Moreover, establishing the observation of the German coastline could 
dramatically reduce the threat of invasion, a danger that the Secretary 
of State for War, Lord Kitchener, considered sufficient to justify 
withholding troops in Britain for defensive purposes, despite the urgent 
need to reinforce the front in France.158 Controlling the German North 
Sea coastline may also have enabled more serious consideration of plans 
to penetrate the Baltic in order to threaten the German iron-ore trade 
with Scandinavia, or to conduct operations against the vulnerable Baltic 
littoral. Such naval operations therefore presented Churchill with the 
attractive possibility of facilitating a major re-focusing of Britain’s war 
effort.
Nevertheless, despite the potential benefits of the scheme, Churchill 
remained sceptical as to the practicality of Wilson’s plan. A conference 
of senior Flag Officers held at Loch Ewe on 17 September unanimously 
rejected the scheme, on the basis that the Fleet would be unable to 
‘reduce’ Heligoland sufficiently to facilitate unencumbered operations 
in the Bight.159 In the aftermath of this meeting, Churchill allowed 
Wilson’s suggestions to lay dormant for several months. Heeding the 
consensus of naval opinion, he even stated his absolute opposition to 
such operations, informing his Cabinet colleagues on 18 October that ‘it 
is not possible by blockade mines to stop a fleet from putting to sea’ and 
156 BL, Add. MS 82455, Report of the Submarine Committee, 5 May 1914, p. 4.
157 Lambert has claimed that Wilson opposed an extensive use of mines in the North Sea; see 
Planning Armageddon, pp. 300–2 and 312–13.
158 K. Neilson, ‘Kitchener: A  Reputation Refurbished?’, Canadian Journal of History, xv 
(1980), pp. 209–10; D. French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914–1916 (London, 1986), pp. 44, 
212; W. Philpott, ‘Kitchener and the 29th Division: A Study in Anglo-French Strategic Relations, 
1914–1915’, Journal of Strategic Studies, xvi (1993), pp. 375–407, at 381; and G.H. Cassar, Kitchener’s 
War: British Strategy from 1914 to 1916 (Dulles, VA, 2004), pp. 34–5, 66, 100–1 and 110–12.
159 TNA, ADM 137/1939, fo. 108, Jellicoe, ‘Conference on Board “Iron Duke”. 17th September. 
Report by the Commander-in-Chief ’, Sept. 1914, p. 1.
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that ‘still less is it possible to stop the enemy’s submarines from putting 
to sea, either by ambush mines or blockade mines’.160 However, amid 
the fallout generated by the Yarmouth raid of 3 November, Churchill 
grew convinced that decisive action to improve the strategic situation 
in the North Sea was urgently required. Encouraged by an Admiralty 
report stating the suitability of the Navy’s existing stock of mines for 
use in the shallow waters off the German coastline,161 Churchill saw fit 
to re-examine Wilson’s proposals. The very same day as the German 
bombardment of Yarmouth, he brought Wilson back to the Admiralty 
as an advisor and saw to it that he received copies of all key planning 
documents.162
V
Scant trace exists of the development of Churchill’s thought processes 
regarding Wilson’s mining proposals during November and December 
1914. He was yet to be persuaded of the value of Wilson’s scheme on 2 
December, as he put forward a proposal for the capture of the Island 
of Borkum off the Dutch coastline, in which he made no mention 
at all of inshore mining.163 As had been the case hitherto, on this 
occasion the resolute opposition of his professional advisors frustrated 
any further consideration of Churchill’s plan.164 However, what is 
clear is that the Admiralty’s concerns regarding the action of German 
submarines in the North Sea and English Channel continued to grow 
as the year progressed. On 4 December, the Admiralty sent a general 
letter to all of the senior officers in Home Waters requesting that they 
submit their remarks on the best methods of combatting the menace of 
enemy submarines.165 This prompted an extensive series of responses, 
with many commanders passing the request down to their captains 
for additional comments. One proposal in particular appears to have 
had an extremely significant impact upon the course of Churchill’s 
strategic thought. It came from the ubiquitous Vice-Admiral Lewis 
Bayly, now serving as the commander of the Grand Fleet’s 1st Battle 
Squadron. As we have seen, Bayly had been associated with both Fisher 
and Wilson’s plans for extensive operations off the German coastline 
and had previously stated his support for the seizure of an advanced 
base in order to establish British control over the German littoral in the 
spring of 1913. It must therefore have come as little surprise that Bayly’s 
submission on anti-submarine warfare was predicated on the belief that, 
160 TNA, CAB 37/121/126, Churchill, ‘Notes on Mining’, 18 Oct. 1914, p. 3.
161 TNA, CAB 37/121/136, P. Dumas and E. Charlton, ‘Notes on Mining’, 24 Oct. 1914.
162 Richmond diary, 3 Nov. 1914, in Marder, Portrait of an Admiral, p. 124.
163 TNA, ADM 137/452, fos. 165–8, Churchill, handwritten memorandum, 2 Dec. 1914.
164 TNA, ADM 137/452, fos. 173–6, de Bartolome to Churchill, Dec. 1914; and fos. 182–3, 
Oliver, untitled memorandum, 15 Dec. 1914.
165 TNA, ADM 137/1046, fo. 18, Draft Letter, 4 Dec. 1914.
 by guest on June 28, 2015
http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EHR
Page 34 of 42 Cooked up in the dinner hour?
as he put it, ‘an evil is best cured by cutting at the root’. He proposed to 
sink blockships in the channels to the German’s newly-captured forward 
submarine base on the Belgian coastline at Zeebrugge, and advocated 
seizing the Island of Borkum, in order to facilitate the maintenance 
of a permanent British presence off the mouth of the German river 
estuaries, ‘so that submarines coming out stand a chance of being seen 
while in shallow water’. Bayly considered that these operations could be 
supplemented by sinking additional hulks in the channels of the river 
Ems to negate the submarines’ ability to proceed to sea submerged and 
by mining the approaches to the Jade, Weser and Elbe.166
While not placing the same emphasis upon sealing the German river 
estuaries with mines as Wilson had done in September, Bayly’s plan 
clearly bore considerable similarity to Sir Arthur’s earlier suggestions. 
Given Bayly’s previous advocacy of such operations, his proposals 
may not seem particularly significant. However, what made the Vice-
Admiral’s submission so important to Churchill was not its content but 
the reaction it received from the C-in-C Grand Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe. 
Hitherto the C-in-C had been a staunch opponent of operations 
directed against the German coastline, citing the danger to the Fleet 
as an insurmountable obstacle. Yet, when he forwarded Bayly’s paper 
to the Admiralty, Jellicoe hinted at a tentative willingness to support 
aspects of his subordinate’s plan. In his covering letter, the C-in-C 
stated that:
I am in favour of blocking as a general principle, but the channels to the 
Ems are so wide that blocking would not be effective. Mining would be 
preferable and might be effective in destroying one or two vessels before the 
channels were swept clear.167
While still intimating his opposition to any attempt to seize Borkum 
and stating his preference for placing mines further out to sea than 
Bayly proposed, Jellicoe thus gave cautious support to the principle of 
inshore mining as a means of countering the German submarine threat 
in the North Sea. He expanded upon his position four days later:
In forwarding the remarks of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly on this subject, 
I expressed my concurrence with many of the ideas, the leading feature of 
which was the principle of dealing with the hostile submarines, as far as 
possible, off the enemy’s ports. This cannot, of course, be carried out in the 
case of all the ports, but where it is feasible, I think it should be done.168
Jellicoe’s submissions were far from stating unequivocal support for 
Bayly’s scheme, but they appeared to Churchill to offer a potential 
foundation upon which it might be possible to establish a consensus 
166 TNA, ADM 137/1046, fos. 86–7, Bayly, ‘Reply to Admiralty Secret Letter’, 9 Dec. 1914, 
pp. 1–2.
167 TNA, ADM 137/1046, fo. 81, Jellicoe to Admiralty, 11 Dec. 1914.
168 TNA, ADM 137/1046, fo. 106, Jellicoe to Admiralty, 15 Dec. 1914.
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of naval opinion in favour of an aggressive inshore mining campaign 
against German submarines. Jellicoe’s cautious advocacy of the 
proposals appears to have had a considerable effect on Churchill. 
The main obstruction that remained to the implementation of any 
such scheme was the absolute opposition of the C-in-C, Fisher and 
the War Staff to any operation that might place the Grand Fleet at 
undue risk. In his covering letter, Jellicoe had made clear that he 
considered risking even a few light cruisers off the German coastline 
to be inadvisable.169 Thus, for any inshore operations to receive the 
consent of his professional advisors, Churchill had to find a means 
of divorcing his plans from any reliance on the close support of the 
Grand Fleet. Acknowledging the unanimity of naval opinion on this 
point, he therefore formed a new plan, based on Wilson’s mining 
proposals. By the end of December, Churchill had created a synthesis 
between Wilson’s inshore mining scheme and Bayly’s plan to capture 
the Island of Borkum, which was less remote and less well defended 
than Heligoland.170 Churchill apparently hoped to combine Wilson’s 
mining campaign with the seizure of a more accessible advanced base 
from which to maintain the minefields. Due to the greater distance 
between Borkum and the German coastline, such a plan would not 
necessarily require the Grand Fleet to enter the Bight in support of the 
bombardment and landings. Furthermore, it could potentially enable 
the Royal Navy to combat the menace of German submarines, without 
tying the Fleet to the defence of Borkum, since the mines in the Bight 
would ‘seal in’ the German Fleet.
It has been customary to view Churchill’s advocacy of capturing 
the Island of Borkum and Wilson’s so-called ‘Heligoland’ proposals 
as distinct and separate.171 However, a close inspection of Churchill’s 
correspondence reveals that this was not the case. While in early 
December Churchill had advocated the capture of Borkum as an isolated 
measure,172 by the end of the month his proposals had been adapted 
significantly to include the key features of Wilson’s inshore mining 
plans. On 31 December Churchill explained the fusion of his advanced 
base plans with Wilson’s Heligoland operation in a letter to Asquith:
The British must capture a German island for an oversea base as soon as 
possible; must mine on the most extensive scale the channels and rivers 
of the German coast; & from their advanced base must prevent the mines 
from being removed.
The only island that fulfils the necessary conditions is Borkum.173
169 TNA, ADM 137/1046, fo. 81, Churchill to Admiralty, 11 Dec. 1914.
170 Churchill Documents, vi. 343–5, Churchill to Asquith, 29 Dec. 1914.
171 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, ii. 176–90. See also Lambert, Planning Armageddon, 
p. 300.
172 TNA, ADM 137/452, fos. 165–8, Churchill, handwritten memorandum, 2 Dec. 1914.
173 Churchill Documents, vi. 348, Churchill memorandum, 31 Dec. 1914.
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Furthermore, he informed the Prime Minister that he intended 
to cover the minelaying operation by deploying forty B and C class 
submarines along with sixty first-fleet destroyers into the Bight for 
five days, thereby removing the need for the Fleet to maintain itself 
in German-controlled coastal waters.174 This proposal represented a 
major departure from his earlier paper of 18 October, in which he had 
opposed inshore mining. Nevertheless, though Churchill consistently 
opposed the indiscriminate sowing of mines through large areas of 
the North Sea as advocated by Fisher,175 he became an advocate of 
an inshore mining campaign, as originally proposed by Wilson, from 
late December 1914 onwards. Indeed, Churchill may have frustrated 
Fisher’s schemes for mining the Heligoland Bight precisely because he 
wanted to conserve mines for use in the direct approaches to enemy 
ports.176 A key factor in his reasoning appears to have been the failure 
of the existing minefields laid in the Channel to prevent the passage of 
the Straits of Dover by German submarines operating from captured 
bases on the Belgian coast.177
Having settled upon a potentially workable plan, Churchill moved 
quickly to try and confirm Jellicoe’s support, which would be crucial 
to implementing any such operation. On 11 January 1915 he wrote to 
the C-in-C explaining his belief that an inshore mining campaign, 
supported by submarines and destroyers operating from Borkum, 
would mitigate Jellicoe’s previous objections that the Fleet would 
be tied to the defence of any advanced base that might be captured. 
Acknowledging the concerns of Jellicoe and the War Staff regarding 
the exposure of the Grand Fleet to an unnecessary degree of danger in 
support of any such operation, Churchill informed Jellicoe that:
I was thinking of the island operation as the first step in an aggressive 
warfare which would, as it proceeds, cow the enemy; beat him into his 
ports, and mine and wire him in there. Except for that purpose, the capture 
would be a mere burden.178
The reference to ‘wiring’, a form of submerged netting intended to 
prevent submarines from passing between or under mines, confirms 
that Churchill had reversed his previous objections to inshore mining 
for anti-submarine purposes. Furthermore, it reveals that he had 
adopted the principle behind the plans Wilson had advocated since 
1911: combatting the danger posed by German submarines by engaging 
them in their most vulnerable position in their own coastal waters. By 
174 For the exact numbers, see TNA, ADM 137/452, fo. 192, Churchill minute, 3 Jan. 1915.
175 For Fisher’s views, see Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought, iii. 121–3, Fisher to Churchill, 
4 Jan. 1915, and attached paper, ‘Minelaying’.
176 For Churchill’s opposition, see Churchill Documents, vi. 323–4 and 325–6, Churchill to 
Fisher, 21 and 22 Dec. 1914.
177 Churchill Documents, vi. 269, Churchill to Fisher, Wilson and Oliver, 19 Nov. 1914.
178 Churchill Documents, vi. 402, Churchill to Jellicoe, 11 Jan. 1915.
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the time that he wrote to Jellicoe, Churchill had already issued top-secret 
instructions that ‘all preparations should be made for the capture of 
Sylt [the codename used for the Borkum expedition]’. Demonstrating 
his intimate involvement with the plans, Wilson’s name was included 
on the tightly restricted distribution list for the minute, below that of 
the First Sea Lord, Fisher.179
Churchill had clearly been won over by Wilson’s reasoning. 
Establishing control over the German North Sea coastline represented 
the only reliable means for the Navy dramatically to alter the 
strategic situation in northern waters and make a major and highly 
visible contribution to the Entente war effort. By early 1915 Wilson 
and Churchill believed that doing so would limit the danger enemy 
submarines posed to the Fleet and potentially open the way for a 
more expansive employment of naval resources. Churchill’s change of 
heart on the desirability of an advanced base did not go unnoticed. 
On 12 January, the day after Churchill had written to Jellicoe, Admiral 
Bridgeman (whom Churchill had removed from the post of First Sea 
Lord in controversial circumstances at the end of 1912)180 wrote to a 
friend that:
It is interesting to hear of the project of seizing a base on German soil for 
a submarine depot. There is nothing new in it, its [sic] merely a revival 
of an old idea … It doubtless w[oul]d be one of the Frisian Islands, & 
probably ‘Wangeroog’ which lies at the Mouth of the ‘Jade’ & is almost in 
the fair way to Wilhelmshaven—a big undertaking … When commanding 
the Home Fleet I was asked by Wilson to arrange for an attack on the place 
[Borkum] … but Churchill laughed at the idea & in consequence the 
scheme went by the board! It is therefore interesting to hear of the revival 
of old projects!181
Exactly how close these plans came to being enacted remains a matter of 
historical debate.182 However, in early 1915 circumstances intervened to 
postpone any final decision. On 1 January a pre-dreadnought battleship, 
HMS Formidable of the Channel Fleet, was lost to an enemy submarine. 
It was widely considered that Bayly, who had been transferred to 
command the force in preparation for the attack on Heligoland, had 
failed to take adequate precautions, and he was duly removed from 
command for carelessness.183 Thereafter, Churchill’s initial intention 
to make the attacks on either 1 March or 15 April was deferred as a 
consequence of the logistical implications of the Cabinet’s decision to 
179 TNA, ADM 137/452, fo. 303, Churchill minute, 3 Jan. 1915.
180 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, i. 259.
181 Bodleian Library, MS. Eng. Hist. 768, fos. 12–14, Bridgeman to Sandars, 12 Jan. 1915.
182 For the best recent analysis, see Black, British Naval Staff, pp. 104–30; G. Clews, Churchill’s 
Dilemma: The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign (Santa Barbara, 
CA, 2010); Grimes, War Planning, pp. 197–211; and Bell, Churchill and Sea Power, pp. 54–75.
183 Grimes, War Planning, p. 201.
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embark upon a naval attack at the Dardanelles.184 However, Churchill 
was quick to return to his plans: as early as 3 March Fisher noted that 
Churchill had proposed detailing Wilson to re-examine the Borkum 
scheme.185 The timing of this move was highly suggestive, coming as 
it did less than two weeks after the commencement of unrestricted 
German submarine warfare against allied trade on 18 February.186 When 
Churchill articulated the detail of his plans at the end of the month, 
the centrality of anti-submarine warfare to his renewed advocacy of 
the Borkum scheme was clear. In a memorandum on 24 March he 
stated that:
The object is to close up the mouth of the Jade and Weser & the Elbe, 
first by lines of mines & secondly by lines of anti-S/M [submarine] nets, 
& so protect these minefields from disturbance by monitors & destroyers 
wh[ich] are themselves not afraid of S/Ms.187
As had been the case in January, however, significant obstacles remained 
to implementing the scheme, not least Jellicoe’s ambiguous attitude. 
Jellicoe later recalled that he never shared the view that the capture of 
an advanced base could assist in driving the German Navy from the 
North Sea and stated that ‘to suggest that we could mine them in their 
harbours as the result of the capture of Borkum is ludicrous’.188 Fisher’s 
attitude to the scheme, which Marder reasonably described as ‘crucial’ 
to the plan’s implementation, was also highly ambiguous.189 It appears 
that Fisher preferred the less ambitious policy of sowing large areas of 
the North Sea with mines and relying upon a policy of ‘steady pressure’ 
to wear down the German war effort.190 Nevertheless, Churchill was 
clearly convinced of the necessity of pushing the scheme through. This 
key difference of opinion may have contributed to the final breakdown 
of the Fisher–Churchill relationship in May.
Assessing exactly how close the Wilson–Churchill scheme came 
to implementation is beyond the scope of this article. What is clear, 
however, is that Fisher deeply resented the fact that Churchill had 
accepted Wilson’s proposals over his own. In the notorious list of 
‘demands’ that Fisher sent to Asquith after resigning his post in May 
1915 the Admiral stipulated that, in order for him to return, he required 
‘that Sir A.K. Wilson leaves the Admiralty and the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and the War Council, as my time otherwise will be 
occupied in resisting the bombardment of Heligoland and other such 
wild projects’.191 He also complained to Jellicoe that ‘A.K. Wilson at 
184 Ibid.
185 Churchill Documents, vi. 622, Fisher to Churchill, 3 Mar. 1915.
186 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, ii. 344.
187 Churchill Documents, vi. 736, Churchill memorandum, 24 Mar. 1915.
188 Quoted in Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, ii. 190.
189 Ibid., pp. 190–8; Grimes, War Planning, pp. 203–11.
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191 Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought, iii. 241, Fisher to Asquith, 19 May 1915.
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the Admiralty is a REAL danger! While I was there it did not signify, 
as I  nullified him’.192 Nevertheless, Churchill’s correspondence from 
December 1914 onwards clearly demonstrates that his preference was for 
a Wilsonian inshore mining campaign, intended to reduce the danger 
from German submarines operating in the North Sea and possibly to 
facilitate an attempt to penetrate the Baltic.
VI
That Churchill had been convinced that Wilson’s inshore mining 
contingencies represented the most realistic anti-submarine warfare 
option available was confirmed by a detailed proposal he made to the 
Cabinet in the summer of 1917. After his return from his self-imposed 
political exile on the Western Front Churchill rejoined the Cabinet 
as Minister of Munitions in July 1917. By this point, the threat that 
German submarines posed to Britain’s war effort had become acute. In 
a newly declared campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, German 
forces succeeded in sinking 3,843,765 tons of Allied and neutral shipping 
between February and July 1917; a ‘veritable slaughter on the shipping 
lanes’.193 As a consequence, the volume of shipping entering British 
ports in February and March 1917 represented only a quarter of what it 
had been a year earlier.194 By mid-April the Cabinet had become deeply 
concerned by the worsening losses, and by the summer the Admiralty 
had been induced to introduce a system of convoys.195 However, before 
the convoy system had been fully established or proven, Churchill had 
presented the Cabinet with an expression of his own views as to how 
best to defeat the German submarines. This paper demonstrated the 
extent to which he had been impressed by Wilson’s views on inshore 
mining and the manner in which his previous support for the seizure 
of an advanced base should be viewed in the context of anti-submarine 
warfare.
At the outset of his remarks Churchill criticised the Admiralty’s 
existing policy of ‘distant blockade and nothing else’. As an alternative, 
he proposed a ‘return to the old and definitely recognised policy of 
close and aggressive blockade’.196 He argued that:
The objects of inshore operations are to fight the enemy, to harass him 
constantly, to occupy and dominate his attention, to force him to recall 
many of his submarines for his own defence, to provoke him to engage in 
frequent action both with his flotillas and heavier vessels, and generally to 
beat him into port and thereafter to mine him in closely with minefields 
192 Ibid., iii. 252, Fisher to Jellicoe, 31 May 1915.
193 Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, iv. 102–3.
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so dense as to be a series obstruction to submarines, and to keep him in by 
sinking any vessels he may send to sweep a channel.197
As he had done in 1914–15, Churchill criticised Fisher’s preferred policy 
of ‘scattering mines and sowing minefields a considerable distance out 
to sea’. In contrast, he informed the Cabinet that seizure of an advanced 
base would permit the Navy
To mine them [the Germans] in ever closer and closer, blocking particularly 
all those channels which are deep enough for submarines to come out and 
go in by. Great numbers of mines set at different depths, or strung together 
in necklaces, would be laid on a comparatively small arc before the enemy’s 
debouches, but at sufficient distance from his batteries; and these would be 
effectively watched and guarded.198
Wilson, who remained at the Admiralty throughout the conflict, 
stoically assisting the war effort, had clearly created a considerable 
impression on the young minister. Ultimately, it was not until the 
attempt to block the channels at the Belgian ports of Ostend and 
Zeebrugge, key forward bases for German submarines, in April 1918 
that the principles behind Wilson’s plans were enacted.199 However, it 
is significant to note that, by this point, an impressive list of highly 
respected officers advocated such operations, including Beatty, Keyes, 
Tyrwhitt, Pound and Bayly.200 While the operation was only a limited 
success at best,201 its eventual acceptance by Jellicoe and the Admiralty 
demonstrated the wide basis of support that now existed for the 
principles behind the plans that Sir Arthur Wilson had advocated since 
August 1911.
At the height of the Agadir Crisis in August 1911, Admiral Sir Arthur 
Wilson proposed to the government that, in the event of an Anglo-
German war, the Navy should mount a close blockade of the entire 
German North Sea coastline. His presentation received a cool reception 
from the assembled ministers and experts, and ultimately precipitated 
Wilson’s retirement before the end of the year. His performance has 
contributed to the perception that the Admiralty lacked a functioning 
planning apparatus and that the Navy failed to offer a coherent 
alternative to the General Staff ’s Continental strategy. Moreover, it has 
also led to condemnation of Wilson’s own abilities as a strategist and 
administrator.
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However, upon closer inspection, the plans Wilson described to 
the government in 1911 represented an almost seamless continuation 
from those promulgated under his predecessor, Admiral Sir John 
Fisher. Furthermore, far from displaying a failure to grasp the realities 
of modern naval warfare and of underwater weaponry, Wilson’s 
presentation was based upon the Navy’s most recent experiments in 
anti-submarine warfare. Indeed, Wilson possessed a far more detailed 
and accurate understanding of contemporary naval strategy than either 
his audience or his subsequent critics. This much was confirmed when 
Winston Churchill revived the rationale behind the plan Wilson had 
presented in 1911 after meeting with the Admiral during the autumn of 
1914. Thereafter, Churchill gave his own iteration of Wilson’s updated 
proposals his full support and lobbied hard for their implementation as 
a means of countering the danger posed by German submarines for the 
remainder of the First World War.
While the practicality of the ambitious amphibious operations 
Wilson advocated to the CID in August 1911 was clearly open to serious 
question, the substance of the naval portion of his strategy—the close 
blockade—was far more credible than has hitherto been appreciated. 
The choice that the Liberal government faced in 1911 was thus not one 
between a moribund, unworkable naval strategy and a ‘continental 
commitment’. Rather, the government was presented with the equally 
unpalatable options of providing direct military support to France, or 
imperilling diplomatic ties with Paris by pursuing a maritime strategy. 
Wilson may have been a poor spokesperson for the latter option, but 
the government’s rejection of his scheme was based upon considerations 
far broader than particular issues of blockade doctrine. Ultimately, it 
was the government’s failure to define its intentions, not the capabilities 
of its professional advisors, which militated against the formation of a 
coherent national strategy prior to the outbreak of war in 1914.
This interpretation of the evolution of Admiralty planning 
between 1905 and 1915 demonstrates the need for further research into 
British naval policy both before and during the First World War. In 
particular, it highlights the limitations in our current understanding 
of the formation of the Admiralty War Staff in 1911–12. While such a 
body could certainly have produced and maintained more extensive 
and detailed planning documents, such as those the War Office had 
presented at the meeting on 23 August, a War Staff was not required 
to steer the course of Admiralty strategy. It is instructive to note that, 
within months of the outbreak of war, Fisher and Wilson—the two 
men most directly responsible for the course of naval strategic planning 
prior to the creation of the War Staff—had both been recalled, largely 
due to the Staff ’s apparent inability to provide sufficient direction 
to the naval war effort. That Wilson’s advice came to be heeded in 
preference to that of the Staff which he had been retired for opposing 
simply serves to underline this fact.
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Furthermore, the emphasis that many historians have placed upon 
the supposedly transformative impact of new technologies, particularly 
underwater weaponry, has failed to account for the way in which the 
Navy evolved to meet new challenges. Nowhere is this better illustrated 
than by the fact that the Navy’s ‘traditional’ strategy of close blockade 
was gradually developed into a progressive solution to the challenge 
posed by submarine warfare. This has contributed to the inaccurate 
depiction of Wilson as a retrograde strategist, whereas, despite his 
numerous failings and unco-operative nature, he was nothing of the 
sort. In particular, the presentation of Wilson as a reactionary force 
who reversed many of the more far-sighted policies that Fisher had 
inaugurated prior to 1910 ignores the continuities in strategic outlook 
between the two men. Fisher and Wilson adopted the same solution to 
fighting a war against Germany in the North Sea: a ‘closer’ blockade 
of the German coastline. The unanimity of opinion between Fisher 
and Wilson demonstrated in this article therefore explains both Fisher’s 
advocacy of Wilson as his successor in 1909–10 and his subsequent 
efforts to defend Wilson’s capacities as a strategist.
It also has wider implications for our understanding of naval policy 
after the outbreak of war. The dynamic at the Admiralty during this 
period was not one of competition between Fisher’s mining scheme and 
Churchill’s advanced base proposals.202 Rather, it was one between two 
rival mining schemes: Fisher’s indiscriminate plan to close the North 
Sea, and the Churchill–Wilson aggressive inshore anti-submarine 
mining campaign. The differences of opinion between Fisher and 
Churchill on the direction of the Navy’s war effort therefore pertained to 
questions of conventional naval strategy: Fisher considered the Borkum 
plan to be too risky, whereas Churchill viewed it as an indispensible 
anti-submarine warfare measure and as a means of establishing British 
control of the North Sea. It was surely no coincidence that Fisher’s 
fleeting advocacy of the Dardanelles campaign, which he later came to 
rue, took shape on the same day that Churchill ordered preparations for 
the capture of Borkum.203 However, the fact that the veteran First Sea 
Lord was firmly against what he considered to be such ‘wild’ schemes, 
does not mean that those schemes were unrealistic.
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